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ABSTRACT
INCENTIVE FACTORS THAT AFFECT THE
REDEVELOPMENT OF
BROWNFIELD SITES IN NEW JERSEY
by
Edison L. Hammond

This thesis sought to address three main questions:
• Are brownfields a significant problem in New Jersey and its
municipalities?
■ What factors have contributed to brownfields' continued existence?
■ What factors are most important for correcting brownfields in the
state?
The study involved surveying Federal and state agencies, NonGovernmental Organizations (NGOs) and municipalities that work with
brownfields. It involved a survey questionnaire, followed by a detailed
telephone interview to determine municipalities' satisfaction with actions
and policies taken by state agencies on brownfield redevelopment.
Eight Federal and state agencies and NGOs participated, along with ten
municipalities from around the state. The major findings were: brownfields
are a significant problem at all levels; urban blight and liability provisions
have contributed to the continued existence of brownfields; and liability
relief and additional funding are the most needed incentives for correcting
brownfields.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Purpose
1.1.1 Research Goal
The aim of this thesis is to determine what role incentives play in
brownfield redevelopment in New Jersey.

1.1.2 Discussion and Definition of Brownfields
"Brownfields" sites are generally defined as "abandoned, idled or
under—used industrial and commercial facilities where expansion or
redevelopment is complicated by real or perceived environmental
contamination" (USEPA, 1997a). This is contrasted with "greenfield" sites,
which are pristine, uncontaminated areas (Murphy, 1995). There is no
definitive number of brownfields; however, estimates run into the hundreds
of thousands. Some are single—contaminant sites where cleanup should be
relatively easy. Numerous substances have contaminated other sites over
many years. Are brownfields a significant problem in New Jersey and its
municipalities? What factors have contributed to the continued existence of
brownfields? What incentives need to be offered to correct the brownfield
situation in New Jersey?
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This study sought answers to these questions from Federal and state
agencies and municipalities. Specifically, the study explored how important
incentive factors are to brownfield redevelopment.

1.1.3 Background on Brovvnfields
Estimates of the number of "brownfield" sites nationwide range from
approximately 130,000 (Maldonado, 1996) to 500,000 (Bartsch and Collaton,
1994). According to one source, New Jersey has approximately 7,000 (Begley,
1996). Another study (Cohen, et al., 1994) has stated that New Jersey has as
many as 17,000 brownfield sites. This study respectfully disputes that
number, as the author's research has shown a "ballpark" figure of 7,000 to
10,000 known contaminated sites, not all of which would be brownfields. In
any event, the state has a substantial number of brownfields, and
determining how to promote the redevelopment of these sites is the central
issue. Many of these sites are located in urban areas, where they were
initially used as industrial sites. However, many sites are also located in
suburban and rural areas.
As industries and the economy changed over the past half— century,
companies moved, closed facilities, or went out of business. Often, they
would abandon these sites, leaving behind the specter of possible or actual
pollution (Bartsch and Collaton, 1994).
Now, these sites can now only be used after some degree of
assessment, characterization and possible cleanup. Because of liability
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concerns, which are discussed later, potential developers may be unwilling
to assume cleanup expenses and the risks associated with a brownfield site,
so the sites often remain unused and continue to deteriorate. However, the
picture is not entirely bleak. A number of sites have been redeveloped, and
are now in productive use. These are sites that have been redeveloped
regardless of any environmental problems or other factors that may have
been present. Examples of redeveloped brownfield sites in New Jersey
include:
■ The former Roebling Cable Works in Trenton, which was redeveloped
into a retail and office complex (NJDEP, 1996).
■ The Mercer Multi—use Sports Facility in Trenton, which was
transformed from a former steel plant into a minor league baseball
stadium (NJDEP, 1996).
• The Newport Development in Jersey City, which was converted from a
railroad yard into a combination residential, office, retail and marina
complex (NJDEP, 1996).
In addition to the sites discussed above, which are all located in New
Jersey, states other than New Jersey have had substantial success in
redeveloping brownfields. California has remediated more than 1300 acres,
and Massachusetts has done over 3200 redevelopment actions in three years
(Dinsmore, 1996).
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This study examined the incentives that played a role in the
redevelopment process, attempted to determine the role those incentives
played, and sought to extract lessons that can be applied to any
governmental entity that has a brownfield problem.

1.1.4 by Should New Jersey Policymakers be Concerned
About Brownfields?
Brownfields pose an economic and political as well as environmental
challenge for policymakers and for the public at large. Their continued
existence leads to:
■ Abandoned property, which undermines the local tax base (Bartsch and
Collators, 1994).
■ Continued deterioration of vacant properties—vandalism, illegal
dumping, and other criminal activity. Concerns about these factors may
make a brownfield site less attractive to developers or business interests
than one where this type of activity does not occur (Bartsch and Collaton,
1994).
Migration of contamination through groundwater or other methods,
causing reductions in neighboring property values (Bartsch and
CoEaton, 1994).
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Clearly, a municipality has reasons to want to encourage the
redevelopment of these properties. If a redevelopment action can be
completed, the municipality stands to gain in areas such as job creation,
increased tax collection, and reduced welfare and unemployment
payments.
Mayor J. Christian Bollwage of Elizabeth, New Jersey, appeared
before the US Senate Environment and Public Works Committee on March
4, 1997. In his statement to the committee, Mayor Bollwage pointed out that
the brownfields problem was caused by the unintended consequences of
Federal Superfund legislation, but that local communities are affected by
these unintended consequences. He noted that, in a 1996 survey, the US
Conference of Mayors found that brownfield sites cost more than $121
million, and that the cost may have been as high as $386 million. In
Elizabeth, Mayor Bollwage's city, there were 56 brownfield sites identified
(as of the date of his appearance). These sites cost his city the opportunity
for job creation, new housing and potential growth in other areas. However,
as he pointed out, there have been examples of redevelopment in Elizabeth.
He specifically pointed to the IKEA and Toys R Us stores built in the city,
noting that these have provided hundreds of jobs, over $1 million in tax
revenues and more than $2 million in Urban Enterprise Zone revenues (US
Senate Environment and Public Works Committee, March 4, 1997).
There are numerous reasons for a municipality to want to redevelop
its brownfields, as is evident in Mayor Bollwage's statement. Jobs, taxes and

new businesses are among the most important issues to a municipal
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government. However, there are certain impediments to brownfield
redevelopment in existing environmental laws. These impediments are
provisions that were originally intended to make polluters pay for the
cleanup of contaminated sites. These provisions actually have caused
lenders, developers and other interested parties not to conduct cleanup and
redevelopment. These unintended consequences occur at both the Federal
and state levels.
The primary Federal law affecting the brownfield arena is the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
(CERCLA), passed in 1980 to address a serious environmental problem: who
is responsible for cleaning up abandoned hazardous waste sites. A
significant part of the act was the establishment of a $1.6 billion
"Superfund," intended to pay for cleanups. This was originally funded
through a series of taxes and assessments, and was to be replenished by the
fines and other monies collected from polluters. Partly to finance this fund,
a liability scheme was imposed that would allow for the imposition of
liability on any Potentially Responsible Party (PRP) (third, 1994). A PRP
could be the current owner of a property, or any party that had ever owned
or participated in management of a site. According to Creenan and Lewis
(1996), liability was imposed if the plaintiff, normally the Government, could
meet some basic tests:
■ The defendant must be a PRP;
■ The site of the cleanup must qualify as a "facility" under CERCLA;
■ There must have been a release of a hazardous substance, or a release
must be threatened at the site;
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■

The plaintiffs remedial actions conform to the National Contingency
Plan (Creenan and Lewis, 1996).

There are several types of liability under CERCLA:
Strict liability is the application of liability based on ownership of a
property, not necessarily culpability. Strict liability was not included in the
original law; it has been constructed by several court decisions as applicable
in assessing liability (Michel, 1995).
Joint and several liability is a provision under which in which any
owners or anyone who has ever participated in management—past or
present—are considered equally liable. Under this provision, the plaintiff
sues the current owner; the current owner is free to secure whatever
compensation he can from past owners. However, the current owner is still
the "first line of defense." Joint and several apportionment gives the
government the ability to go after a "deep pocketed" party, resulting in a
greater likelihood of cost recovery (Michel, 1995; also, Hird, 1994).
Retroactive liability is a provision under which a PRP is liable for all
previous contamination on a property, whether he caused it or not. This has
been compared to ex post facto law, but the courts have upheld its legality as
long as Congress does not act arbitrarily or irrationally (US v. Monsanto)
(Michel, 1995).
A major New Jersey law that has affected the development of
industrial properties is the Industrial Site Recovery Act (ISRA). This law
requires notice prior to any transfer of property. The law also requires the
development of detailed cleanup plans, or a determination of no
contamination (NJSA 13:K-9, pp. 20-21). If a party does not comply with
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these provisions, or submits a false determination, the New Jersey
Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) can impose a fine of $25,000
per incident (each day counts as a separate incident). Additionally, the law
gives DEP the authority to invalidate any sale of industrial property if the
previous owner does not submit a cleanup plan, or fails to comply with an
approved cleanup plan (NJSA 13:1 K-12, p. 30).
As Page and Rabinowitz (1994) note, these laws have slowed
redevelopment of contaminated sites in two ways: first, by imposing the
specter of liability on any potential purchaser, and second, by the threat of
delays and the resultant higher costs that result from perceived
environmental uncertainties (Page and Rabinowitz, 1994).

1.2 What Elements Make Up the Brownfield "Equation"?
During the course of research for this thesis, it became apparent that there
are generally three components to the brownfield
"equation"—environmental, economic, and socio—political. A brief
description of each of these is found below, along with a discussion of how
they are important in the brownfield redevelopment issue.

1.2.1 How Environmental Factors Affect Brownfield
Redevelopment
Environmental factors make up a significant portion of the brownfield
issue, as mentioned earlier. Brownfield sites may range from small,
single—contaminant sites to large industrial plants such as former steel
mills or abandoned military installations. Determining the extent and type
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of environmental problems, if any, that are present on a site may be an
expensive and time—consuming process.
There are a number of areas that must be considered in a brownfield
remediation or redevelopment action. A partial listing of these areas would
include soil contamination. A developer would need to know what potential
contaminants are in the ground and what technological solutions are
available to deal with them (determination of the "best" solution may vary
from one case to another, and from one developer to another). Another area
is groundwater. A remediator would need to know how far below the
surface the water table lies, and whether any contaminants have gotten into
the water table. It is also important to know if any contamination has
migrated from the site. A third area of environmental interest is the
presence of underground storage tanks. If a site has ever been used as a
transportation facility, factory, or served a similar function, it may have
underground storage tanks. These must be checked for leaks, they may
have to be removed (depending on their size), and any leakage must be
cleaned up. An additional issue for consideration is Risk—Based Corrective
Actions (RBCA). A remediator or planner must know what the proposed
end use is for a site, and whether there are different cleanup standards that
may be applied based on that use. It is probably more expensive to clean a
site to residential standards than to industrial standards. The decision to
clean to residential standards may not make sense if a site is to be used as
an industrial plant in the future.
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The environmental portion of the equation is not an easy one to deal
with, and doing so requires a sound knowledge of the science and principles
involved.

1.2.2 How Economic Factors Affect Brownfield Redevelopment
The economic viability of a brownfield site constitutes another significant
part of the picture. There are many sites that have already been
redeveloped, and there are other sites that could be redeveloped with the
application of the proper incentives. There are also sites that are not likely
ever to be redeveloped regardless of any other factor. Although this may
seem obvious, a point worth stating is that not all brownfield sites will ever
be viable for redevelopment from a purely economic standpoint.
Sites in the first two categories are generally economically viable, or
have the potential for economic viability after cleanup. This includes sites
that have already been redeveloped and sites that could be viable with the
addition of incentives. That is, the cost of cleaning up the site must not be
excessive when compared to the expected profit for the site's developer after
redevelopment. An example of a site that could be economically viable with
the proper incentives is the former Magic Marker site in Trenton, New
Jersey. This site once housed a lead—acid battery manufacturing plant. It
now lies vacant, but initial site characterization work and been undertaken.
The site is heavily contaminated with lead and PCB's (lead contamination
exists up to 49,000 parts per million; the current commercial use standard,
by way of illustration, is 600 parts per million). Until buildings on the site

are torn down, the full extent of the contamination will not be known. The
City of Trenton hopes to tear down the building in the next two to three
years, and is pursuing the responsible party. The responsible party has
been identified, and the issue of liability is currently in litigation. A final
resolution to these issues is still some time away, but a likely use for this
site is a mixed commercial facility (Lord, 1998).
Sites in the third category (those unlikely to be redeveloped) are
generally small, scattered lots for which the economic viability would be
considered poor. For example, Jersey City, New Jersey has approximately
750 40' by 80' lots that are undeveloped and currently unused (Kearns, 1998).
Because of the limited potential use of these sites, along with the expense of
site investigations and any necessary cleanup activity, sites in this category
are probably unlikely to ever be redeveloped.
Many sites in this third category do not appear to meet the strict
definition of brownfields, but it will be argued later that the definition of
brownfields should be expanded to include abandoned or under-utilized
residential as well as industrial properties.

1.2.3 Why Socio-political Factors Are the Key to Brownfield
Redevelopment
The socio-political area of brownfield redevelopment is perhaps the most
difficult part of the equation. Factors in this area will come into play when a
community is organized around a common goal—the redevelopment of its
neighborhoods. This can involve many groups such as community
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organizations, local mayors and municipal council members and others.
Often, these groups will have different agendas from one another; this can
slow or stop a redevelopment action.
The list of stakeholders in this area is large, as is illustrated by
Figure 1 below. A lack of cohesion among these stakeholders can slow or
stop redevelopment. The figure represents a general idea of how the various
players coordinate and direct policy matters. (This illustration is not
all—inclusive. For reasons of space and clarity, the Executive Branch and
the Legislative Branch at the Federal and state levels have not been
included. These entities are represented by the Federal and state agencies
that are depicted. Additionally, the developer is not shown here. Although
developers are the ultimate users of these sites, their role in redevelopment
lies outside the scope of this thesis.)
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Figure 1. A Notional Representation of the Relationships Between Entities
involved in Brownfield Redevelopment

1.2.3.1 Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs): NGOs play an
important role. NGOs such as ISLES, Inc., an NGO in Trenton, have
facilitated successful redevelopment actions in their communities. The
outreach activities they conduct are educating residents about how to get
governmental agencies involved on their behalf. In addition to the Magic
Marker site discussed earlier, some projects ISLES, Inc. has worked on
include:
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The Crane site, which is currently being redeveloped, has a proposed 100%
commercial end-use. One new building already exists on this site, and
houses a candle-making facility (Lord, 1998).
Another (unnamed) manufacturing site is planned for conversion to open
space. There is uncertainty as to what was manufactured here, and there
has been spill-over from a nearby scrap recycling facility. (The recycling
facility owner has agreed to share the cost of cleanup.) It appears that this
is a promising site for conversion to parkland or other open space in a
neighborhood that is predominantly industrial (Lord, 1998).

1.2.3.2 Federal Agencies: The United States Environmental. Protection

Agency (EPA) has a major role in the brownfield process. EPA directs
brownfield pilot projects around the country, and provides grants to help
communities conduct redevelopment. In New Jersey, the current pilot sites
include Newark, Perth Amboy, Elizabeth, Camden, Jersey City and Trenton
(USEPA, 1998).
The United States Economic Development Administration (EDA)
provides funds to support the redevelopment of infrastructure and business
incubator services to states, local governments, public or private non-profit
agencies, and others. Projects receive priority consideration if they establish
or expand commercial or industrial facilities, create new private sector
jobs, fulfill a pressing need of the local community, or meet certain other
criteria (US Department of Commerce, 1998).
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The United States Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) administers several financing programs that affect brownfield
redevelopment. Among these is the Community Development Block Grant
(CDBG) Program, which provides funds to cities and state governments to
facilitate the redevelopment of privately owned buildings and sites. Another
is the Section 108 Loan Guarantee Program, which allows local
governments to finance projects that are too large for CDBG financing.
(Bartsch and Collaton, 1994)
Also available are the Enterprise Community and Empowerment
Zone (EC/EZ) programs, which target designated areas in a community for
special Federal funding and other incentives to stimulate private sector
economic activity. (Bartsch and Collaton, 1994)

1.2.3.3 State Programs: State government has an important role to play as
well. Significant actions at the state level in New Jersey include the Bagger
Law, which allows a ten year, phased—in property tax abatement on
contaminated properties which are remediated. New Jersey also has a law
releasing municipal governments from liability when they take ownership
of a property under tax seizure. Some of these laws are discussed in more
detail in the next chapter.
Major Players at the State Level: The New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection (DEP) plays an important role in the brownfield
redevelopment process as a primary executor of the Federal and state laws
which deal with this area. DEP has available tools such as the Voluntary
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Cleanup Plan, under which responsible parties enter into agreements to
conduct remediation on a site. Once remediation is complete, DEP will issue
a No Further Action Letter. This generally frees the party from further
action for past contamination. It is important to note that there are some
significant exceptions to the No Further Action Letters, such as a change in
remediation standards. However, it provides a qualified level of finality
(NJDEP, 1996).
The New Jersey Economic Development Authority administers the
Hazardous Discharge Site Remediation Fund, which makes loans and
grants available for the conduct of site investigation and remediation
(NJDEP, 1996).

1.2.3.4 Local Government: Local government plays perhaps the most
important role in redeveloping its brownfields. It is the local community
that suffers the greatest impact from brownfields, and therefore, local
government which has the most to gain from remediation and
redevelopment. If a local government is well organized and cohesive, it will
have a good chance of bringing in the necessary elements to conduct
redevelopment. Among the actions local governments can take are the
establishment of a redevelopment authority; the channeling of tax breaks on
individual properties, and the approval of zoning variances when a
redevelopment action would appear to be in the community's best interest.
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1.3 Concluding Comments
While there appears to be some degree of overlap among the various areas
of importance to brownfield redevelopment, most of the incentives appear to
fall within the socio—political realm. Therefore, most of the discussion in the
next sections will deal with that area. This is not intended to slight the
importance of the environmental problems that brownfields cause to the
local community and its residents; nor is there an intent to downplay the
importance of economics to the brow nfield equation. However, most of the
-

incentives for brownfield redevelopment are the result of political actions
(the passage of laws, the workings of state and local governments, etc.) or
the result of social actions (the development of a neighborhood development
group which lobbies the municipal government). While all parts of the
equation are important, and all sectors have roles to fulfill, the
socio—political sector constitutes the key, without which the other elements
would not be able to conduct site remediation and redevelopment as
efficiently as they do under the current system.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE SURVEY

2.1 Introduction
Most of the incentives currently available for brownfield redevelopment are
in the socio—political arena, as was discussed in the previous chapter. A
survey of the literature on brownfields bears out this conclusion, as outlined
in this chapter. The interrelationships of the three components that were
discussed in the previous chapter are discussed here (environmental,
economic, and socio—political).
The results of the literature survey are presented in three
parts—environmental, economic, and socio—political. The environmental
area includes discussions of some types of issues that are important to
identify in a project. These issues can present challenges that, if not dealt
with properly, can cause a project to fail. The economic area includes
discussions about the potential costs and benefits associated with
brownfield redevelopment. There is also the identification of a potential
threshold for redevelopment projects. The socio—political area includes
discussion of two state laws that affect the brownfields redevelopment
process. Laws may not normally be included in a literature survey, but
these are of such importance to the process in New Jersey that a short
discussion of them is appropriate.
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2.2 What the Environmental Literature Says
The environmental literature has tended to focus on methods and problems
related to site remediation or cleanup. This is a critical step in brownfield
redevelopment, and there must be either set standards or a generally
accepted understanding of "how clean is clean" before a cleanup action can
be successfully completed. However, in many cases cleanup is tied to
redevelopment. As Scovazzo and Strubble (1990) point out, remediation
actions on a Superfund site may continue for years. When dealing with
brownfields and developers, cleanups need to be done economically and
thoroughly to remove contamination, and to be defensible in court if
challenged. Cleanups also need to be done in a timely manner to speed the
redevelopment action. This places constraints on environmental
consultants, engineers, scientists and others involved during the
investigation, cleanup and re—use phases. Scovazzo and Strubble list the
following as critical to brownfield environmental assessments:
■ Demonstrating that the property is environmentally acceptable for
the planned use.
• Resolving any environmental problems in the time allotted.
■ Controlling costs and schedules for site investigations and
remediation actions so that the transaction is still profitable.
(Scovazzo and Strubble, 1990)
An example of interest is a former rail and port facility located in
Baltimore, Maryland. This site needed extensive remediation before it could
be converted into a mixed commercial and retail center. The effort involved
characterization of the areas most likely to have been contaminated by past
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use; the examination of structures and other facilities on the site; sampling
at various points to determine the extent, nature and potential pathways for
the spread of any contaminants; and the determination of appropriate
methods for conducting the cleanup (Scovazzo and Strubble, 1990). In
addition to the environmental considerations, this case is important from
an economic context because of the continuing need to control costs and
schedules so that a property transaction can proceed without incurring
excessive costs or delays. Delays in either cost or schedule can potentially
cause a project to fail, and may drive the developer to seek a greenfield
solution.
A second example of note in the environmental literature is found in
Woburn, Massachusetts. This site has been extensively studied, and two
books have been written about the case history, in addition to the journal
article cited here. One book dealt with the legal cases of families who had
suffered diseases as a result of environmental poisoning (Harr, 1990); the
subject of the second was the role of community action groups in dealing
with the toxic waste issues (Brown and Mikkelsen, 1997).
Numerous former industrial sites (tanneries, glue factories,
chemical plants and other industries) had left the Industri—plex site
contaminated with chromium, arsenic, lead and other substances which
needed to be dealt with before the site's conversion to a regional
transportation center (Salvesen, 1993). Remediation and redevelopment on
this site was estimated at $50 million. However, in this instance,
contamination will not be removed; rather, it will be contained in place
through the application of artificial barriers (capping) (Salvesen, 1993).
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These cases both demonstrate that, while environmental processes
such as site investigation and cleanup are necessary for a successful
redevelopment project, they must be managed so as not to cost to much or
take too long. If either of these occur, environmental considerations can
scuttle a project and cause developers to look elsewhere. Then, it becomes
likely that a greenfield site which has no environmental history will be
selected for development.

2.3 What the Economic Literature Says
Much of the literature in the economic portion is found in journal articles,
and has dealt with the cost—benefit ratio involved in brownfield
redevelopment. The primary economic issue is whether the potential costs
associated with redevelopment outweigh the potential benefits that will
accrue to the site after redevelopment (specifically, will the developer make
enough of a profit on the project to make the project worthwhile?).
Potential costs include the unknown or uncertain qualities associated
with a site. Examples include the severity and type of contamination; the
willingness or unwillingness of the lending community to assume risks;
and the projected (potential) value of a given site after successful
remediation and redevelopment. These types of considerations tend to make
it difficult for a potential developer to quantify costs (and therefore profit
margins), and may lead to some of the following:
■ Reduced value of collateral. If a property that is to be used for
collateral has not been properly characterized and assessed
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beforehand, a lending institution may find that its value is less than
was previously expected.
• Inability of borrowers to repay loans if they must also pay cleanup
costs.
■ Potential for a lender to become liable for the costs of cleanup in the
event of foreclosure.
■ The possibility that a borrower would not maintain the facility in an
environmentally appropriate manner (future liability) (Bartsch and
Collaton, 1994).
Potential benefits include:
■ The ability of a successful redevelopment project to influence other
sites in the immediate area.
■ The potential for increased property value on a redeveloped site
(which will probably lead to increased property tax collection on the
site).
• The increased capacity for job creation (which will probably lead to
increased income tax revenues on the personal income that jobs
generate).
■ The overall intangible quality of life in a community.
There may also be benefits to the community in the form of improved
human health conditions. The removal of contaminants may have an
impact on residents living near a brownfield site, and could also cause
property values to rise after redevelopment (Bartsch and Collaton, 1994).
One example is found in an article by K. Connolly and D. Daddario.
Titled "How to Find the Green in Your City's Brownfields," this article
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discusses several communities and how they dealt with brownfield
problems. One such community is Vernon, California. This town, located
near Hollywood, has converted a closed steel mill into an industrial center
housing more than 60 firms, and employing more than 1,500 people.
As Connolly and Daddario point out, there was a need to find the
money to pay for the environmental cleanup while keeping the total cost
(including the sunk costs for site cleanup) competitive for sale. This was
done, in part, by selling scrap steel from the mill facility to raise money.
Also, the site was used to film action sequences for a movie. The movie's
producers paid to demolish buildings and clear away debris. Approaches
like this one may not work in all communities, this case shows some of the
creativity that communities have employed to get their brownfields cleaned
up in an economical manner.
In another case, Page and Rabinowitz posited that a threshold exists
for development interests in a property (whether public, private or mixed).
(Page and Rabinowitz, 1994) If a property falls below this threshold, it is less
likely to be redeveloped; if a property lies above the threshold, its
redevelopment becomes more likely. This threshold says that the likelihood
of redevelopment decreases as the risk of contamination increases. Page
and Rabinowitz define the risk of contamination as the costs of
environmental cleanup plus the risks of environmental liability and
potential delay. The threshold spans the continuum from risk—averse
developers, who are likely to select sites where the risk of contamination is
near zero, to risk—tolerant developers who can absorb risks. They also note
that "some sites below the threshold would not provide enough incentive for
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redevelopment even with little contamination present because of poor
market and/or economic returns" (Page and Rabinowitz, 1994). In other
words, the threshold is a guideline, not an absolute indicator of a site's
redevelopment potential.
Page and Rabinowitz cite four cases in which redevelopment
decisions were made. Variables in these cases included the site's location;
type and amount of contamination; the estimated cost of cleanup; the
expected value of the site after cleanup and redevelopment; willingness to
assume risks; and the ability to secure financing for remediation. In each
case, the buyer, seller, financier or oversight agency applied creative
solutions to address the problems found at each site. This resulted in
returning unproductive property to productive use in each case; however,
the redevelopment actions were not always conducted in a traditional
cost—benefit scenario. In the first instance, the initial site cleanup plan
called for the removal of 250,000 cubic yards of soil. An alternative was
selected which allowed the soil to be treated on site and used as fill for the
project. The use of innovative technology (on—site bioremediation) kept the
overall cost within limits that were acceptable to the eventual purchaser.
Because this technology was applied, the purchaser got a clean parcel of
land for $2 million less than the original asking price (Page and
Rabinowitz, 1994).
In the second case, an 80—acre site housed a former tannery, and had
been unused for decades. The seller wanted a purchaser to take the property
sight unseen, and wanted indemnification for past liability as a condition of
the sale. In exchange, the seller was willing to accept a very low price for
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the property. The predominant contamination, as was revealed during an
inspection after the sale, is asbestos. The prospective purchaser accepted
liability for any environmental problems in exchange for the low selling
price. A purchaser was eventually found who accepted the terms; this
purchaser now "owns" the liability for the site, but has a site that meets his
specific needs. It is located near the purchaser's largest customer, and is
located on Lake Michigan, which the new owner thinks will be an
additional advantage. The new owner has dealt with risky properties in the
past, and believes that this property will be a long—term asset in spite of its
current risks (Page and Rabinowitz, 1994).
In the third case, redevelopment would have been cost—prohibitive
without a large infusion of Federal funds. The site had been a
manufacturing facility for automobile switches and controls from 1919 to
1980, and was heavily contaminated with the metals that are associated
with this type of manufacturing. Asbestos was also present in the
building's insulation. The early estimates for site cleanup and
redevelopment were in the range of $75,000 to $100,000. This was beyond the
acceptable range to private developers or the city. However, the final total
cost was much higher. As a result of escalating costs for site cleanup and
structural renovation, the project was in danger of failing. The state's
Congressional delegation got a special grant of $3.5 million, and the site
cleanup and redevelopment could proceed. The final cleanup costs were
three times what was originally estimated, mainly because of the added
costs of dealing with the removal of chromium (Page and Rabinowitz, 1994)
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Redevelopment of the fourth site, according to the authors, could
probably not have taken place under today's stricter environmental
standards. This is a 42—acre island located in the Allegheny River near
downtown Pittsburgh. Initial redevelopment of the site was proposed in
1981, with proposed end use as a mixed project with offices, light industrial
facilities, recreational facilities including tennis courts and a park, and
housing. Cleanup costs escalated in the late 1980's when a small but
serious pool of PCB's was found. This caused serious delays while a
solution was found, and caused much uncertainty about what the solution
would be. Initially, it was believed that the PCB's would have to be shipped
to a toxic waste facility several hundred miles away. The state's
Department of Environmental Protection was persuaded, however, to allow
the disposal of this contaminated soil on site under strict conditions. This
required the construction of a secure landfill, as well as the redesign of
significant portions of the use plan. Total cleanup costs here were estimated
at $25 million, half of which came from state funds, thus showing the
state's commitment to redeveloping this site (Page and Rabinowitz, 1994).
These cases show the impact that economics can have on a project.
Even when redevelopment appears to be a straightforward process, plans
can be delayed, changed or even halted because of economic concerns.
There are actions that can help to offset these economic concerns.
Specifically, release from liability would remove much uncertainty. Also,
the purchase of environmental insurance could remove an area of concern
for potential developers.

27
2.4 What the Socio—political Literature Says
The socio—political literature includes laws that are expected to encourage
brownfield redevelopment. Two of the most important laws, in addition to
those discussed in the previous chapter, are New Jersey's "Environmental
Opportunity Zone Act", also known as the Bagger Law, and the recently
signed Senate Bill S-39, also known as the "The Brownfield and
Contaminated Site Remediation Act."
The Bagger Law allows for a phased tax exemption for the
remediation of contaminated properties, as long as the money that would be
due for property tax is used for site remediation. This law also provides for a
series of funds to both property owners and municipalities to assist in
remediation and in dealing with discharges of hazardous materials (New
Jersey Public Law 1631, January 10, 1996).
The Brownfield and Contaminated Site Remediation Act provides a number
of incentives for brownfield remediation. These include:
• Innocent Purchaser Protection, which provides a liability exemption
from the Spill Compensation and Control Act for purchasers who
complete remediation of a property.
■ Development of Presumptive Remedies. This is a change under
which the DEP will develop "protective redevelopment remedies" that
may be implemented without DEP approval. This will help to expedite
redevelopment.
■ Tax incentives will provide reimbursement for up to 75% of the cost of
remediation of a contaminated property.
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■ Additionally, under an Environmental Opportunity Zone (EOZ)
Amendment, the number of Enterprise Zone neighborhoods
increased from 20 to 27, and it is now permitted to undertake
residential construction in an EOZ. (Previously, only industrial or
commercial development was allowed in an EOZ.) (New Jersey Public
Law 1997, January 6, 1998).
Other entries in the socio—political literature have demonstrated that
states have assumed a significant role in resolving brownfield problems in
their jurisdictions.
For example, Sweeney discusses the role of state governments in
establishing Voluntary Cleanup Programs. He points out that, as of mid
1995, 20 states had adopted some form of Voluntary Cleanup Program.
(Sweeney, 1995). (This number has increased since then, because New
Jersey has added a Voluntary Cleanup Plan. Other states may have added
Voluntary Cleanup Programs as well.)
There have also been articles in the literature which cover state
programs aimed at limiting lender liability, or at speeding the land
recycling process.
Michel, for instance, provides an overview of Ohio's answer to its
brownfield problem, Ohio Senate Bill 221. In this legislation, the Ohio
legislature places limits on liability, and provides standards to determine
"how clean is clean." The Ohio program allows for a great deal of flexibility
by the remediating party, and with the potential issuance of a no further
action letter, provides a degree of finality in the process. (Michel, 1995)
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Pennsylvania took a similar approach, according to Creenan and
Lewis. Under the Pennsylvania Land Recycling Program, a series of
standards were established, depending on the proposed end use of a site.
The Pennsylvania program also provides for releases from liability for
certain parties (mainly innocent purchasers and volunteer remediators),
and provides state funding to assist with remediation activities (Creenan
and Lewis, 1996).
As the reader has seen, there is an interrelationship between each of
the areas discussed — the environmental, the economic and the
socio—political. None of these areas could effectively spur brownfield
redevelopment alone, and it is where the three areas come together that
redevelopment is most likely to succeed. Although site cleanup and
redevelopment may occur within any of these areas, or with a combination
of any two, it is more likely that redevelopment will succeed where all three
areas come together.

2.5 Expected Contribution
2.5.1 Gap in the Existing Literature
Previous studies and articles have dealt with specific brownfields issues
such as lender liability (Murphy, (1995), state programs that address legal
issues (Berger, et al., 1995), and economic aspects associated with
brownfield redevelopment. (Connolly and Daddario, 1995). Other studies
have analyzed broader issues of redevelopment, such as the role crime and
safety plays in a site redevelopment decision, and the profit motive for
developers (Bartsch and Collaton, 1994; Cohen, et al. 1994). However, none
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has looked at the incentives for brownfield redevelopment as applied to a
state. Most have focused their examinations on states and their land
recycling (primarily liability relief) programs, as with Creenan and Lewis
or Michel. Some studies have focused on metropolitan regions. An example
of this is a study by Cohen, et al., which provided case studies on several
communities in EPA Region II (New Jersey and New York). This study
differs from previous works by being more quantitative than previous
works. It also differs in its approach — focusing on the incentives available
within a single state — not just on the legal programs available for land
recycling.

2.5.2 Potential for Brownfields Policy Development
This study will contribute to the literature base by conducting an
examination of incentive factors in New Jersey, limited to those incentives
that cities, States and the Federal government can offer to make
redevelopment attractive. Because the brownfield "system" is constantly
changing, the study will not attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of new
incentives that may be introduced during the course of the study. It will,
however, gather information from working level professionals about the
incentives they believe would most help their communities in the
redevelopment process. This study will offer recommendations to expand
the brownfield program, to develop standards that ensure finality after a
cleanup action, and to conduct further study on a larger scale — and will
fill a gap in the existing literature by doing so.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction
The overall study objectives, assumptions, hypotheses and study variables
will be discussed here so that the reader may fully understand the scope of
the project.
The overall objective of the project was to examine the incentives for
brownfield redevelopment to see if the state and its municipalities have all
the tools needed to facilitate brownfield redevelopment. If not, the study
would determine what was needed, and provide this information to Federal
and state policymakers. This was accomplished by:
■ Gathering information from Federal and state agencies and NGOs to
determine their perspectives on brownfields issues.
■ Gathering information from municipalities to determine their
perspectives on brownfields issues.
■ Further exploring of selected issues of special significance.
One issue of special significance is the role of state agencies that deal
with brownfields (specifically, the New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection and the New Jersey Economic Development
Authority) and the level of satisfaction with these agencies' brownfields
policies. Policy tools that are needed for the redevelopment of brownfields
that are not currently available are identified.
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3.2 Limiting Factors
This study was bounded by the following assumptions.
■ All cities, townships and boroughs in New Jersey have brownfields.
■ Infrastructure issues (the adequacy of roads, utilities and similar
factors) are a basic part of the brownfield decision process.
The New Jersey DEP maintains a list of Known Contaminated Sites
(the KCS list) that have been reported to it. Normally, municipalities report
this data to the DEP, although it can come from other sources. The listing is
comprehensive; the July 1997 edition listed over 7,000 sites located
throughout the state (NJDEP, 1997). Not all of these sites are brownfields;
some are residential properties, and some are governed by other programs,
but it seems likely that many of these sites could be considered as
brownfields. Because of the geographic dispersion of the sites on the DEP's
KCS list, it seems highly likely that brownfield sites are prevalent in all
communities.
If a site lacks adequate infrastructure, it will not be considered for
redevelopment regardless of its other attributes (physical location, lack of
contamination, etc.). Although infrastructure is an important
consideration for potential developers, its absence may not stop development
in all cases.
This study was limited to New Jersey because of the state's high
density of brownfield sites — in excess of 7,000 according to one author
(Begley, 1996).
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3.3 Study Population
The study population consisted of the following groups:
•

State and Federal agencies that deal with brownfield policy issues.

■ Non—Governmental Organizations (NGOs) that work on brownfield
issues at the local, state or regional levels.
■ Municipalities from around New Jersey. The municipalities were
selected to provide a mix of small towns and large cities.
Among the state and Federal agencies that are involved with
brownfields policy issues is the United States Environmental Protection
Agency. This is the primary Federal agency involved in brownfields policy
issues. Also in this group are the New Jersey Department of Environmental
Protection and the New Jersey Economic Development Authority. The US
Department of Housing and Urban Development and the US Economic
Development Agency were not surveyed because they do not appear to have
a direct role in making brownfield policy; rather their role appears to
providing funding only. Similarly, the New Jersey Department of
Commerce was initially included, but was later dropped because of its
limited role in brownfield policy issues. The New Jersey Economic
Development Authority was included as a more policy—oriented agency.
NGOs that work with brownfields issues are:
■ New Communities, which develops low—income housing in the City
of Newark.
■ The Ironbound Community Development Corporation, which works
in one area of Newark to empower the residents of the Ironbound
neighborhood.
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■ ISLES, Inc., which has facilitated redevelopment actions on several
Brownfield sites in conjunction with the City of Trenton and various
neighborhood groups.
■ The Northeast—Midwest Institute (NEMW). NEMW is a non—partisan
policy organization that works with members of Congress from
Northeastern and Midwestern States. The organization provides
policy development and support, as well as community education
activities.
Ten municipalities from around the state participated in the study,
broken out as follows:
• Six cities with populations over 75,000. The cities included were
Camden, Elizabeth, Jersey City, Newark, Paterson and Trenton.
■ Four municipalities with populations under 50,000. The
municipalities included were Atlantic City, New Brunswick, Newton
and Phillipsburg.
The cities and municipalities selected were drawn from areas
throughout New Jersey. They were not randomly selected, but most have a
significant number of sites on the KCS list (generally more than 60 for the
large cities, and generally more than 25 for smaller municipalities.)
Exceptions were made on a case—by—case basis, to incorporate other
municipalities that could provide unique insights to the study. The
methodology outlined in the section above was conducted with officials in
the selected municipalities, as well as with officials from the Federal and
state agencies and the NGOs.
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3.4 Methodology
The methodology involved a number of steps. These were:
▪

Establish hypotheses to be tested

■ Identify potential participants
• Identify study variables
■ Develop questions and survey instruments
■ Contact specific participants
■ Collect data
• Conduct data analysis
Establishment of the hypotheses took place after a review of the
literature on brownfields. The literature review led to the overall questions
that are the subject of the study — what has caused brownfields, and what
is needed to remedy them. The hypotheses are targeted at specific elements
within those questions, and will be presented later.
Identification of the study variables also took place after the literature
review. This process involved examining cases in the literature to see what
factors had been noted as significant in other cases and determining
whether or not they might apply to New Jersey.
Identification of the potential study participants required analysis of
the roles Federal and state agencies played in making brownfield policy,
and determining which NGOs could provide useful information from a
policy perspective. This step also required determining which
municipalities might provide good study subjects. This was accomplished
by reviewing the KCS list to determine which municipalities had the
greatest number of sites on the list. Further analysis was conducted to
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determine the estimated population of each municipality to determine if it
was a large city or a smaller municipality. The population cutoff for large
cities and smaller municipalities was arbitrarily established at 75,000. This
allowed identification of all of the largest cities in New Jersey, and a
selection of smaller municipalities drawn from around the state.
The development of questions and survey instruments was a crucial
step in conducting the study. After the hypotheses and variables had been
identified, it was necessary to look at questions from a policy perspective. In
other words, it was necessary to develop the questions from a practical
standpoint that a policymaker would understand. This was accomplished
by testing several versions with people who were familiar with the issues,
and incorporating their comments. This resulted in a relatively short,
easily understood questionnaire.
The next critical milestone involved contacting the potential
participants. This step required being able to explain the project succinctly,
and it required a measure of perseverance to contact everyone whose
municipality or organization was on the list. If an agency contact or a
municipal representative agreed to take part in the study, their name was
added to the list to receive a survey. All who were contacted initially agreed
to participate; however, there were two municipalities that did not respond
to repeated requests for information. There was also one anonymous
response from a municipality.
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The data collection for this study was done in two basic parts:
administration of the survey instruments discussed above; and development,
administration and analysis of a follow—up telephone interview.
In the first step, surveys were sent to the officials whose agencies or
municipalities agreed to participate in the study. A list of the survey
participants can be found in Appendix G. Twenty surveys were sent out to
the study participants. Eighteen surveys were returned, for a total response
rate of 90%. The overall quality of data received varied, with most returned
surveys containing excellent data. However, not all respondents answered
all questions. Non-responses to questions, in a study population as small as
this one, could have significantly skewed the results. Accordingly, the data
need to be viewed with caution.
The study used two survey instruments. These were nearly identical
in form, but differed in focus. One was sent to Federal, state and NGO
respondents, who are identified in the study population below. This survey
asked questions at the larger level, focusing on brownfield issues in the
state as a whole. The other was sent to municipal officials, and focused on
brownfield issues in their communities. The municipalities are identified
in the study population below. The survey instruments are shown at
Appendix A (Federal/State/NGO Survey) and Appendix B (Municipal
Survey). After the initial surveys were completed and returned, the results
were analyzed to determine how significant respondents thought
brownfields were, negative impacts of brownfields, what they believed
caused brownfields, positive effects if brownfields were redeveloped, and
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what they believed were the most likely solutions were for brownfields. The
results of the survey are discussed in detail in the next chapter.
The second step was the development of a follow—up interview, which
was administered only to municipal respondents who had completed the
earlier survey. The interview is at Appendix E. This was intended to give
the respondents an opportunity to comment on brownfield policy
instruments that are currently available as well as to identify those things
they thought were needed for brownfield redevelopment. Respondents also
had an opportunity to provide opinions and insights about the effectiveness
of state agencies they deal with on brownfield issues.
After all the interviews were completed, the results were analyzed to
determine the overall perceptions of effectiveness and municipal
satisfaction with the state agencies and their policies, and the overall
satisfaction with brownfield policy tools that currently exist in New Jersey.
Interview participants were also given the opportunity to identify policies or
tools they believed would be most helpful to them in doing their community
brownfields work. Results of these interviews are discussed in the next
chapter, and may be found at Appendix F.

3.5 Hypotheses
J. State and Federal agencies and NGOs will view brownfields as a
significant problem in New Jersey. Based on the sheer number of
known contaminated sites throughout New Jersey and their
dispersion around the state, most state agencies and NGOs that deal
with brownfields will view them as a significant problem. The
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Federal and state agencies and NGOs may also view brownfields as a
significant problem because of the perception of New Jersey as a less
than desirable place to do business. This perception could be seen as
leading businesses to relocate to other States, or to leave New Jersey
for more positively viewed locations.
■ Municipal officials will view brownfields as a significant problem in
their communities. Municipalities bear the greatest burden of
abandoned or underutilized property. Municipalities lose tax revenue
on the property. They lose the opportunity to have jobs created on the
sites. The image of affected communities is impacted so that they do
not seem to be a good place to live or work. Therefore, it is likely that
municipal officials will view brownfields as a significant problem.
■ The most likely factor which has contributed to the existence of
brownfields throughout the state will be liability provisions in
environmental laws. While environmental laws have not directly
caused the occurrence of brownfields, the conditions that have arisen
out of the laws (specifically in the liability provisions) will probably be
seen as a major factor behind the conditions that have led to
brownfields.
■ Federal and state agencies and NGOs will view relief from liability
under current environmental laws as the most important incentive
factor for brownfield redevelopment. There will likely be a difference
in the Federal/State/NGO and municipal perspectives as to the
importance of various incentives leading to the redevelopment of
brownfields. It is likely that, from a Federal, state and NGO
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perspective, liability relief will be seen as more important than any
other potential remedy. This is because this type of incentive could
potentially be offered to communities throughout the state, and would
conceivably not cost the state treasury a significant amount of
revenue to implement.
Liability is also a likely concern for developers throughout the
state. Although that group is not included in this study, others have
noted it as a concern. A thesis is currently being done to analyze the
role of liability to developers.
■ The most important incentive for municipalities will be additional
funding from any source. While the Federal/State/NGO group will
probably view liability relief as the most important corrective action,
municipalities will probably see additional funding as the most
important incentive for brownfield redevelopment. It is likely that
municipalities will want additional funding to provide for site
assessment, for remediation, or to compensate for lost tax revenues.
This could come from Federal or state sources, or from any
combination of public—private financing vehicles.

3.6 List of Variables
Three basic variables are likely to impact on brownfield redevelopment as
outlined in this study. These are:
■ Tax incentives. This includes adjustments to the tax rates on
property being redeveloped, or local adjustments to property, or
designation of a community as an Enterprise Community,
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Empowerment Zone, or some other specific incentive. It also includes
the complete exemption of specific property from any tax. Tax
incentives may enhance development of brownfield sites by lowering
the capital costs required to do business in an area.
■ Liability relief. This includes any Federal or state program that
provides or could provide relief from liability under current
environmental laws. Relief of this type may enhance brownfield
redevelopment by encouraging development companies and lending
institutions to take action on properties without the fear of high
cleanup costs. Liability relief would also provide a degree of certainty
to the development process, in that a current property owner would
not be liable for contamination caused by a former owner.
■ "Other" programs. This includes any program that eases the
redevelopment of property. This could include such things as zoning
variances, which could make cleanup standards easier to attain.
Another example is the availability of funds from any source. These
funds do not need to be targeted specifically toward brownfields for
consideration here, as in the case of the Community Development
Block Grant discussed in Chapter 1.

local community. This used a Likert scale, with I. being low value (Not at

all Significant), and 5 being high value (Very Significant).
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■ Negative effects of brownfields, either in New Jersey or in the local
community. This used a Likert scale, with 1 being low value (Not at all
Likely to Impact) and 5 being high value (Very Likely to Impact). The
factors that were included are:
-

Lower property values.

- Lowered property tax revenues.
- Job losses to other states or other communities.
-

Urban blight.

- More crime/a less safe environment.
■ Likely contributing factors for the continued existence of brownfields
(ranked from 1-5, with 1 being most important and 5 being least
important).
Factors to be ranked included:
-

Liability provisions in environmental laws.

-

Tax policies that deter redevelopment of brownfields.

-

Lack of available funding for the purchase and remediation of
brownfields.

-

Existing blight in urban areas.

- Crime and public safety issues.
■ Factors that could be useful in speeding the brownfield redevelopment
process. Factors were ranked from 1-7, with 1 being most important and
7 being least important. Factors to be ranked included:
- State adjustments to tax rates.
-

Local adjustments to tax rates.

- Targeted tax breaks from any level of government.
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- Programs that provide liability relief under environmental laws.
- Availability of additional funding from any source.
- Zoning variances.
■ Positive effects on the state or on the local community if all brownfields
were returned to productive use. Factors were scaled using a Likert
scale, with 1 being low value (Not at all Likely to Occur) and 5 being high
value (Very Likely to Occur). The factors in this section were:
- Higher property values.
-

Enhanced property tax revenues.

- Job creation.
- Improving blighted areas.
-

Reduced crime and improvements to the safety environment.

■ The perceived effectiveness of policies that could assist in brownfield
redevelopment. These factors were rated using a Likert scale, with 1
having low value (Not at all Effective for Brownfield Redevelopment) and
5 having high value (Very Effective for Brownfield Redevelopment). The
factors were:
-

Tax relief from the state or Federal government.

-

Liability relief from the state or Federal government.

-

Availability of funding (loan guarantees, grants, etc.)

The structured interview, which was conducted after the completion of the
questionnaire, was only administered to those municipal officials who had
responded to the earlier survey. The interview asked for responses to the
following:
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■ Rating the effectiveness of agencies for assisting communities in
brownfield redevelopment. Respondents were asked to rate the agencies
using a Likert scale with 1 having low value (Not at all Effective) and 5
having high value (Very Effective). The agencies were the New Jersey
Department of Environmental Protection and New Jersey Economic
Development Authority.
■ Rating the satisfaction with actions taken by the agencies in brownfield
redevelopment. Respondents were asked to rate the agencies using a
Likert scale with 1 having low value (Not at all Satisfied) and 5 having
high value (Very Satisfied). Again, the agencies were the New Jersey
Department of Environmental Protection and New Jersey Economic
Development Authority.
• Rating the effectiveness of policy tools currently available in New Jersey.
Respondents were asked to rate the policy tools using a Likert scale with
1 having low value (Not at all Effective) and 5 having high value (Very
Effective). The policies are listed below:
- Ten-Year Tax Abatement to Offset Remediation Costs on
Properties Being Remediated.
-

The Industrial Site Recovery Act.

-

The Spill Act Fund.

- The Voluntary Cleanup Plan.
-

Funding to Assist Property Owners in Conducting Remediation.
- Funding to Assist Municipalities in Dealing with Discharges
of Hazardous Materials.
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■ Open—ended questions to obtain the municipalities' insights on what
tools they think are needed but not currently available for Brownfield
redevelopment.

3.6.2 Mode of Observation
This study required detailed telephone and personal coordination with local
and state government officials and NGO staff in order to effectively
communicate milestones and desired goals. A study of this kind could not
be unobtrusive, but this one was conducted so as to be as non—intrusive as
possible. It was possible, through effective coordination, to reduce the
disruption to respondents to a minimum while gathering the necessary
information to complete the project.

3.6.3 Concluding Comments
Detailed discussion and analysis of the results takes place in the next
chapter. This chapter served to give the reader a better understanding of
how those results were obtained, and what was the overall scope of the
study.

CHAPTER 4

DATA ANALYSIS, RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

4.1 Introduction
This chapter provides an analysis and discussion of data collected in
support of the objectives outlined earlier. The data are presented in two
parts. The first part contains the results of the initial survey mailed to
respondents during late 1997 and early 1998. The second part contains the
results of telephonic follow—up interviews conducted with municipal
respondents during early 1998.
The study population was divided into two groups, as was discussed
earlier. The first group, called the "Federal/State/NGO Group", was
comprised of the Federal and state agencies that deal with brownfields, and
of the NGOs that work on brownfield issues. The NGOs were all placed into
this group because it is likely that they will approach brownfield issues
differently than would municipal officials. Although these NGOs will
probably have different approaches, client populations and focus from one
another, they should be similar enough to allow for inclusion as one part of
this group. Their approaches to brownfields issues also are likely to be
different enough from municipal respondents so that the NGOs could not be
placed in that group. It is also possible, however, that the NGOs will have
different perspectives from the other members of this group. Discrepancies
in the data will be explained where possible.
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The principal Federal agency involved in brownfield policy, the US
Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA), is deeply involved in brownfield
issues at the national and regional levels. USEPA has sponsored numerous
workshops and other community outreach activities to educate and inform
community leaders about brownfield issues. As part of its outreach
activities, the agency also has recently published two documents that
provide information to municipal stakeholders. The first, "Road Map to
Understanding Innovative Technology Options for Brownfields
Investigation and Cleanup," provides information about the numerous
technological options that are available for brownfield redevelopment, and
provides a "road map" of the steps that are generally needed for
redevelopment (USEPA, 1997a). The second, "Tool Kit of Information
Resources for Brownfields Investigation and Cleanup," provides detailed
information about the different types of technologies that are available for
brownfield cleanup (USEPA, 1997b). These are presented as examples of the
resources available from USEPA.
Although other Federal agencies such as the Department of Housing
and Urban Development and the Economic Development .Agency provide
funding that states and municipal governments can use for brownfield
redevelopment, they have not been included here because they do not appear
to have a direct role in making policy for brownfield redevelopment.
The state agencies are the New Jersey Department of Environmental
Protection (NJDEP) and the New Jersey Economic Development Authority
(NJEDA). These agencies are involved in brownfields issues to varying
degrees. NJDEP is the central agency involved in brownfield issues
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throughout the state. NJDEP works with communities, conducting
outreach and education programs to educate stakeholders about brownfield
issues. It compiles and updates the list of Known Contaminated Sites (also
known as the KCS list), and assists remediators in complying with the
provisions of the state's Voluntary Cleanup Plan. NJDEP also enforces
Federal and state environmental laws.
NJEDA also is fairly heavily involved in brownfield issues in the
state. NJEDA administers loan and grant programs that assist individuals
and municipalities in conducting remediation and redevelopment
activities. The agency works with NJDEP to assist companies in dealing
with site investigation and cleanup. It makes loans to companies of up to $1
million, and loans and grants to municipalities of up to $2 million. The
funds are available to businesses that cannot obtain funding on their own,
and to municipalities and individuals undertaking a voluntary cleanup of a
site (NJEDA, 1998).
Municipal officials who participated in the study formed the
"Municipal Group". These respondents came from various city agencies.
Some were from the City Engineer's Offices; others were from Urban
Enterprise Zone (UEZ) administrator's offices, while some represented the
Economic Development or Redevelopment offices. All municipalities in the
initial survey group ultimately participated in the study, with the
exceptions of Hoboken, Edison and Camden. However, one of these three
municipalities responded anonymously. All had been given numerous
opportunities to participate. It is regrettable that they did not want to make
their positions known to policymaking officials.
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4.2 Survey Results
4.2.1 General Discussion
The results presented here are shown in two categories: the
Federal/State/NGO Group is shown first, and the Municipal Group is
shown second. Detailed analysis of the results is discussed later; the most
important findings are shown now, so that the reader may better
understand and follow the analysis.
From the Federal/State/NGO perspective, the most likely factors
contributing to the continued existence of brownfields in New Jersey were:
■ Existing blight in urban areas.
■ Liability provisions contained in the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act (Superfund Act), or in other
environmental laws.
■ Lack of available funding for the purchase and remediation of
brownfields.
The most important factors for correcting brownfields were:
■ Programs that provide relief from liability under environmental laws
(CERCLA, ISRA, etc.)
■ Availability of additional funding from any source (Loan guarantees,
grants, public—private consortiums, etc.)
■ Targeted tax breaks from any level of government (e.g., designation of a
community as an Empowerment Zone or Enterprise Community).
The most likely positive effects of brownfield redevelopment were:
■ Improving blighted areas. All respondents felt that this would happen
with brownfield redevelopment.
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■ Job Creation. Again, all respondents felt that this would happen with
brownfield redevelopment.
■ Higher property values. Again, all respondents felt that this would
happen with brownfield redevelopment.
From the municipal perspective, the most likely factors contributing to the
continued existence of brownfields in the local community were:
• Liability provisions contained in the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act (Superfund Act), or in other
environmental laws.
■ Lack of available funding for the purchase and remediation of
brownfields.
■ Tax policies that deter redevelopment of brownfields.
The most important factors for correcting brownfields were:
• Availability of additional funding from any source (Loan guarantees,
grants, public—private consortiums, etc.)
■ Programs that provide relief from liability under environmental laws
(CERCLA, ISRA, etc.)
• Targeted tax breaks from any level of government (e.g., designation of a
community as an Empowerment Zone or Enterprise Community).
The most likely positive effects of brownfield redevelopment were:
■ Improving blighted areas. Eighty percent of respondents felt that this
would happen with brownfield redevelopment.
• Enhanced property tax revenues. A majority of respondents said this
factor would happen with brownfield redevelopment.
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■

Job creation. Again, a majority of the respondents said this would
happen with brownfield redevelopment.

Federal, State and NGO Participation: Using the methodology described
in the previous chapter, surveys were sent to eight Federal and state
government agencies and NGOs. These were USEPA, the
Northeast—Midwest Institute, New Jersey Department of Environmental
Protection, New Jersey Economic Development Authority, ISLES, Inc., New
Communities, and the Ironbound Community Development Corporation.
Responses were received from all eight, for an overall response rate of 100%.
Municipal Participation: Surveys were sent to twelve municipalities.
These were Atlantic City, Camden, Edison, Elizabeth, Hoboken, Jersey City,
Newark, New Brunswick, Newton, Paterson, Phillipsburg and Trenton.
Responses were received from ten municipalities, for an overall response
rate of 83.3%. One response was submitted anonymously. The response rate
includes the anonymous submission.
The total response rate (Federal/State/NGO and Municipal) was 90%.
Eighteen of twenty surveys sent out were eventually completed and
returned.

4.2.2 Hypothesis One
state and Federal agencies and NGOs will view brownfields as a significant
problem in New Jersey.
Test Question, Response and Discussion
Test Question: Study participants were asked the following: "How
significant a problem are brownfields in New Jersey?"
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Respondents were asked to rate how significant a problem they viewed New
Jersey's brownfields to be. Possible ratings were from 1 (Not at all
Significant) to 5 (Very Significant). This question was addressed to Federal,
state and NGO respondents only.
Response: One hundred percent of respondents said they believe that
brownfields are a significant problem in New Jersey. The responses
received to this item are scored below. Distribution of the responses is found
in Table 2 at the end of this chapter.
Mode: 5
Median: 4.5
Average: 4.5
Discussion: All eight participants answered this question. All rated
brownfields as a "Significant" or "Very Significant" problem for New Jersey.

4.2.3 Hypothesis Two
Municipal officials will view brownfields as a significant problem in their
communities.
Test Question, Response and Discussion
Test Question: Study participants were asked the following: "How
significant a problem are brownfields in your community?"
Respondents were asked to rate how significant a problem they viewed their
community's brownfields to be. Possible ratings were from 1 (Not at all
Significant) to 5 (Very Significant). This question was addressed to
municipal respondents only.
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Responses: Sixty percent of respondents said they believe that brownfields
are a significant problem in their communities. Twenty percent of
respondents said they believe brownfields are neither significant nor
insignificant within their communities. Ten percent of respondents said
that brownfields were an insignificant problem in their communities, and
ten percent did not provide a response to this item. The responses received
to this item are shown below. Distribution of the responses is found in Table
3 at the end of this chapter.
Mode: 5
Median: 4
Average: 3.89
Discussion: The data show that most respondents believe brownfields are a
significant problem in their communities. Sixty percent of those surveyed
felt that brownfields were either significant or very significant in their
communities. Twenty percent responded that brownfields were neither
significant nor insignificant in their communities, and ten percent
responded that brownfields were and insignificant problem. Although the
overall response to this question was that brownfields are a significant
problem to the local community, it was expected that municipal
respondents would generally give brownfields more significance than they
did.
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4.2.4 Hypothesis Three
The most likely factor contributing to the continued existence of brownfields
in of brownfields throughout the state, from both the Federal/State/NGO
perspective and the municipal perspective, will be liability provisions in
environmental laws.

4.2.4.1 Test Question from the Federal, State and NGO Perspective:
Study participants were asked to respond to the following question by
ranking the factors listed. Rankings were from 1 (Most important) to 5
(Least important).
"Many factors have been thought of as causes for brownfields.
Below are a list of factors that are commonly thought as causes
of brownfields. Please rank them in terms of how responsible
you think they are in terms of causing New Jersey's
brownfields. Assign only one number per statement."
Discussion: Somewhat surprisingly, the most important factor

contributing to the continued existence of brownfields in the
Federal/State/NGO group was existing blight in urban areas. This was
followed by lack of available funding for the purchase and remediation of
brownfields. Liability provisions in existing environmental laws ranked
third, followed by crime and public safety issues. The least likely factor was
tax policies that deter redevelopment of brownfield sites.
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■ Existing blight in urban areas was rated the most important factor for
the continued existence of brownfields. It was ranked first by 25% of the
respondents, second by 12.5%, third by 25%, and fourth by 25%. No
response was received from 12.5% of the participants.
■ Lack of funding for the purchase and remediation of brownfields was
rated second in importance. It was ranked first by 25% of
respondents, second by 37.5% of respondents, third by 0%, fourth by
12.5% and fifth by 12.5%. No response to this item was received from
12.5% of the participants.
■ The third most important factor contributing to the continued
existence of brownfields was liability provisions in existing
environmental laws. This was ranked first by 37.5% of respondents,
second by 25%, third by 0%, fourth by 12.5% and fifth by 12.5%. No
response to this item was received from 12.5% of the participants.
■ The fourth most likely factor contributing to the continued existence
of brownfields was crime and safety issues. This was not ranked first
or second by any respondents. It was ranked third by 37.5% of
respondents, fourth by 12.5%, and fifth by 37.5% of respondents. No
response to this item was received from 12.5% of the participants.
■ The least likely factor that has contributed to the continued existence
of brownfields is tax policies that deter redevelopment of brownfields.
This was not ranked first by any respondents. It was ranked second
by 12.5% of respondents, third by 25%, fourth by 25% and fifth by 25%
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of respondents. No response to this item was received from 12.5% of
the participants. Distribution of the responses to this item is found in
Table 4 at the end of this chapter.

4.2.4.2 Test Question from the Municipal Perspective: Respondents

were asked to respond to the following question by ranking the factors listed.
Possible rankings were from 1 (Most important) to 5 (Least important).
"Many factors have been thought of as causes for brownfields.
Below are a list of factors that are commonly thought
responsible for brownfields. Please rank them in terms of how
responsible you think they are in terms of your community's
brownfields. Assign only one number per statement."
Discussion: The most likely factor for the continued existence of

brownfields at the municipal level was liability provisions in environmental
laws. This was ranked as the number one factor by 50%, as the number two
factor by 20% and as the number three factor by 10% of respondents. No
respondents rated this item fourth or fifth, and no response to this item was
received from 20% of the participants.
■ The second most likely causative factor was lack of available funding
from any source. This was ranked as the number one factor by 40%,
and the number two factor by 40% of respondents. No respondent
ranked this item third, fourth or fifth in importance. Twenty percent
of the returned questionnaires did not contain a response to this item
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■ The third most likely factor was tax policies that deter the
redevelopment of brownfields. This factor was not ranked as the most
important factor by any respondents. It was ranked second by 10% of
respondents, third by 40% of respondents, fourth by 10% of
respondents and fifth by 20% of respondents. Twenty percent of the
returned questionnaires did not contain a response to this item.
■ The fourth most likely factor was existing blight in urban areas. This
factor was not ranked first or second by any respondents. It was
ranked third in importance by 30%, fourth by 30% and fifth by 10% of
respondents. Thirty percent of the returned questionnaires did not
contain a response to this item.
■ The least likely factor was issues relating to crime and public safety.
This factor was not ranked first, second or third by any respondents.
It was ranked fourth by 30% and fifth by 40%of respondents. Thirty
percent of the returned questionnaires did not contain a response to
this item. Distribution of the responses is found in Table 5 at the end
of this chapter.

4.2.5 Hypothesis Four
The most important incentive for state and Federal agencies and NGOs will
be liability relief.
Test Question, Responses and Discussion
FederallStateINGO Perspective: Respondents were asked to respond to
the following question. They were asked to rank the items from 1 (Most
important) to 7 (Least important).
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"Many factors have been thought of as potential remedies
(corrective actions) for brownfields. Below are a list of remedies
that may or may not help to solve New Jersey's brownfields
problems. Please rank them in terms of how important you
think they are in terms of correcting New Jersey's brownfields.
Assign only one number per statement."
Discussion: Here, as expected, liability relief is seen as the most important
potential remedy for brownfields. This factor was ranked first by 37.5%,
second by 25%, third by 12.5%, and seventh by 12.5% of participants. No
response was received from 12.5% of respondents. It is interesting to
remember that existing blight in urban areas was seen as the most likely
causative factor for brownfields. It appears that there may be a disconnect
between perceived cause and remedy.
■ The second most important remedial factor is additional funding. This
was ranked first by 25%, second by 25%, and fourth by 50% of
participants. All participants responded to this item.
■ The third most important potential remedy is targeted tax breaks. This
factor was ranked first by 25%, second by 37.5%, fourth by 12.5% of
respondents, and fifth by 12.5% of participants. It was not ranked third,
sixth or seventh by any respondents. No response was received from
12.5% of respondents.
■ Fourth most important is adjustments to local property tax rates. This
was ranked first by 12.5%, third by 25%, fifth by 12.5%, and sixth by 12.5%
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of participants. This item was not ranked second, fourth or seventh by
any participants. No response to this item was received from 37.5% of
respondents.
■ Fifth in importance was tax exemptions on specific properties. This
factor was ranked second by 12.5%, third by 37.5%, fifth by 12.5%, and
seventh by 12.5% of participants. No respondents ranked this item first,
fourth or sixth in importance. No response to this item was received
from 25% of respondents.
■ Sixth in importance was adjustments to state tax rates. This factor was
ranked fourth by 12.5%, fifth by 25%, and sixth by 37.5% of participants.
This item was not ranked first, second, third or seventh by any
participants. No response to this item was received from 25% of
respondents.
■ Least important was zoning variances. This factor was ranked fifth by
12.5%, sixth by 12.5%, and seventh by 37.5% of participants. This item
was not ranked first, second, third or fourth by any participants. No
response to this item was received from 37.5% of respondents.
Distribution of the responses is found in Table 6 at the end of this
chapter.
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4.2.6 Hypothesis Five
The most important incentive factor for municipalities in redeveloping
brownfields will be additional funding from any source.
Test Question, Responses and Discussion
Municipal Perspective: Respondents were asked to respond to the
following question. They were asked to rank the items from 1 (Most
important) to 7 (Least important).
"Many factors have been thought of as potential remedies
(corrective actions) for brownfields. Below are a list of remedies
that may or may not help to solve brownfields problems. Please
rank them in terms of how important you think they are in
terms of correcting your community's brownfields. Assign
only one number per statement."
Discussion: As expected, the most likely remedial factor for brownfields at
the municipal level was additional funding. All respondents ranked this
first or second in priority.
■ The second most likely remedial factor was liability relief. This was
ranked first by 20% of respondents, second by 30% of respondents, fourth
by 10% of respondents, fifth by 10% of respondents, and sixth by 10% of
respondents.
■ The third most likely remedial factor was targeted tax breaks from any
level of government (designation as an Empowerment Zone or
Enterprise Community). This was ranked second by 30% of respondents,
third by 20% of respondents, fourth by 10% of respondents and seventh by
10% of respondents.
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• The fourth most likely remedial factor was tax exemptions on specific
properties. This factor was ranked second by 10%, third by 30%, fourth by
10%, sixth by 10%, and seventh by 10% of participants. No participants
ranked this factor first or fifth. No response to this item was received
from 30% of respondents.
■ The fifth most likely remedial factor was state programs to adjust tax
rates. This was ranked third by 10%, fourth by 20%, and fifth by 10% of
participants. No participants ranked this factor first, second, sixth or
seventh. No response to this item was received from 60% of respondents.
■ The sixth most likely remedial factor was adjustments to local property
taxes. This was ranked third by 10%, fourth by 20%, fifth by 20%, and
seventh by 10% of participants. This factor had been expected to rank
higher than it did; its actual position was a surprise. No participants
ranked this item first, second or sixth. No response to this item was
received from 40% of respondents.
■ The seventh and final remedial factor was zoning variances. This factor
was ranked fifth by 10% of respondents, sixth by 30% of respondents, and
seventh by 10% of respondents. No respondent ranked this item higher
than fifth in importance. No response was received for this item from
50% of respondents. Distribution of the responses is found in Table 7 at
the end of this chapter.
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4.2.7 Other Factors
Other items were discussed on the survey as well. Both groups were asked
to rate the likelihood of effects they believed would occur if all brownfields in
New Jersey, or in their communities were returned to productive use. The
factors considered are shown below. All participants were asked to rate
these factors on a scale of 1 (Not at all Likely) to 5 (Very Likely). The rating
for each factor was based on how likely each respondent believed the factor
was to occur in New Jersey or in each community.

4.2.7.1 FederalUState/NGO Perspective:
■ Improving blighted areas. This factor was rated either Very Likely or
Likely by 100% of respondents. It was rated Very Likely by 62.5% of
respondents, while 37.5% rated it Likely. This was ranked first of five
factors. Distribution of the responses is found in Table 8 at the end of this
chapter.
The statistical scores associated with this factor are as follows:
Mode: 5
Median: 5
Average: 4.67
■

Job creation. This factor was rated Very Likely or Likely to happen by
100% of the respondents. This factor was rated Very Likely 50% by of
respondents; the remaining 50% rated it Likely. It was ranked second of
five factors. Distribution of the responses is found in Table 9 at the end of
this chapter.
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The statistical scores associated with this factor are as follows:
Mode: 5
Median: 4.5
Average: 4.5
• Higher property values. All respondents (100%) rated this factor as Very
Likely or Likely to happen if all brownfields in New Jersey were
redeveloped. Fifty percent of participants rated this factor Very Likely,
and the remaining 50% rated is as Likely. It was ranked third of five
factors. Distribution of the responses is found in Table 10 at the end of
this chapter.
The statistical scores associated with this factor are as follows:
Mode: 4
Median: 4
Average: 4.33
■ Enhanced property tax revenues. This factor was rated Very Likely or
Likely by 87.5% of respondents. It was rated Neither Likely nor Unlikely
to happen by 12.5% of respondents. It was ranked fourth of five factors.
Distribution of the responses is found in Table 11 at the end of this
chapter.
The statistical scores associated with this factor are as follows:
Mode: 4
Median: 4
Average: 4.17
■ Improved crime and safety issues. This factor was rated Very Likely or
Likely by 87.5% of respondents. It was rated as Neither Likely nor
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Unlikely by 12.5% of respondents. This factor achieved a statistical tie
with enhanced property tax revenues, as shown above. Distribution of
the responses is found in Table 12 at the end of this chapter.
The statistical scores associated with this factor are as follows:
Mode: 4
Median: 4
Average: 4.17

Most respondents viewed all of these factors very positively, as the
analysis above shows. There was a very small quantitative difference
between the most likely and the least likely positive factors.

4.2.7.2 Municipal Perspective:

■ Improving blighted areas. Most respondents (80%) rated this as very
likely to happen in their communities if all brownfields were
redeveloped. This factor was ranked Very Likely by 60% of respondents,
Likely by 20% of respondents, and Neither Likely nor Unlikely by 10% of
respondents. No response to this item was received from 10% of those
surveyed. This factor was ranked first of five in importance. Distribution
of the responses is found in Table 13 at the end of this chapter.
• Enhanced property tax revenues. Most respondents (80%) rated this as
very likely to happen in their communities if all brownfields were
redeveloped. This factor was ranked Very Likely by 50% of respondents,
Likely by 30% of respondents, and Neither Likely nor Unlikely by 10% of
respondents. No response to this item was received from 10% of those
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surveyed. This factor ranked second of five in importance. Distribution of
the responses is found in Table 14 at the end of this chapter.
•

Job creation. Most respondents (80%) rated this as very likely to happen
in their communities if all brownfields were redeveloped. This factor
was ranked Very Likely by 40% of respondents, Likely by 40% of
respondents, and Neither Likely nor Unlikely by 10% of respondents. No
response to this item was received from 10% of those surveyed. This
factor ranked third of five in importance. Distribution of the responses is
found in Table 15 at the end of this chapter.

■ Higher property values. Most respondents (80%) rated this as likely to
happen in their communities if all brownfields were redeveloped. This
factor was ranked Very Likely by 30% of respondents, Likely by 50% of
respondents, and Neither Likely nor Unlikely by 10% of respondents. No
response to this item was received from 10% of those surveyed. This factor
ranked fourth of five in importance. Distribution of the responses is found
in Table 16 at the end of this chapter.
■ Improved crime and safety issues. Most respondents (60%) rated this as
likely to happen in their communities if all brownfields were
redeveloped. This factor was rated Very Likely by 30% of respondents,
Likely by 30% of respondents, and Neither Likely nor Unlikely by 30%
respondents. No response to this item was received from 10% of those
surveyed. This factor was ranked fifth of five in importance. Distribution
of the responses is found in Table 17 at the end of this chapter.
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4.2.8 Effectiveness of Incentives
Both groups were also asked to state how effective they thought certain types
of incentives would be in the brownfield redevelopment process. The factors
considered are shown below. All participants were asked to rate these
factors on a scale of I (Not at all Effective) to 5 (Very Effective) based on how
effective they perceived each item to be in terms of helping to speed
brownfield redevelopment in New Jersey or in each community.

4.2.8.1 Federal/State/NGO Perspective:
■ Availability of funding (loan guarantees, grants, public—private
agreements, etc.). All respondents rated this factor as effective in
redeveloping New Jersey's brownfields. More than one third (37.5%) of
respondents rated this factor as Very Effective, and an additional 37.5%
rated it as Effective. No response to this item was received from 25% of
those surveyed. This factor had an average score of 4.5 out of a possible 5,
and was ranked first of three in importance. Distribution of the
responses is found in Table 18 at the end of this chapter.
■ Liability relief from the State or Federal government. Most respondents
(75%) rated this factor as effective in redeveloping New Jersey's
brownfields. This factor was rated Very Effective by 50% of respondents;
25% of respondents rated it Effective, and 12.5% of respondents rated it as
Ineffective. No response to this item was received from 12.5% of those
surveyed. This factor had an average score of 4.17 out of a possible 5, and
was ranked second of three in importance. Distribution of the responses
is found in Table 19 at the end of this chapter.
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■ Tax relief from the state or Federal government. Most respondents
(75%) rated this factor as effective in redeveloping New Jersey's
brownfields. This factor was rated Very Effective by 25% of respondents;
50% of respondents rated it as Effective, and 12.5% of respondents rated it
as Neither Effective nor Ineffective. No response to this item was
received by 12.5% of those surveyed. This factor had an average score of
4.17 out of a possible 5, and was ranked third of three in importance.
Distribution of the responses is found in Table 20 at the end of this
chapter.

4.2.8.2 Municipal Perspective:
■

Availability of funding (loan guarantees, grants, public—private
agreements, etc.). All respondents who provided a response to this factor
rated it as an effective tool in redeveloping their community's
brownfields. This factor was ranked Very Effective by 90% of
respondents. No response to this item was received from 10% of those
surveyed. This factor had an average score of 5 out of a possible 5, and
was ranked first in importance. Distribution of the responses is found in
Table 21 at the end of this chapter.

■ Liability relief from the state or Federal government. Most respondents
(70%) rated this factor as an effective tool in redeveloping their
community's brownfields. This factor was ranked Very Effective by 40%
of respondents, Effective by 30% of respondents, and Neither Effective nor
Ineffective by 20% of respondents. No response to this item was received
from 10% of those surveyed. This factor had an average score of 4.22 out
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of a possible 5, and was ranked second of three in importance.
Distribution of the responses is found in Table 22 at the end of this
chapter.

• Tax relief from the state or Federal government. Most respondents (60%)
rated this factor as effective in redeveloping their community's
brown.fields. This factor was ranked Very Effective by 10% of
respondents, Effective by 50% of respondents, and Neither Effective nor
Ineffective by 30% of respondents. No response to this item was received
from 10% of those surveyed. This factor had an average score of 3.77 out
of a possible 5, and was ranked third of three in importance. Distribution
of the responses is found in Table 23 at the end of this chapter.

4.2.9 Respondent Comments
All respondents were given the opportunity to provide other comments on
areas that may not have been included in the survey. Some respondents
were critical of state agencies and the help they provided to individual
communities. Other respondents said that what they needed was additional
funding to accelerate their redevelopment efforts. Although respondents
were asked at several points to rate or rank the importance of additional
funding, several respondents took the opportunity to emphasize the need for
additional funding in their communities. Comments have been edited for
clarity, but not for content. Samples of comments included the following:
NJDEP has been and continues to be the greatest hindrance to
redevelopment. Under ECRA (the Environmental Compensation and
Recovery Act), there was little to no communication with the community.
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DER's (Declarations of Environmental Restriction) are put in place then
properties abandoned, when alternate technologies could have been used to
make the land available for resale. (Municipal respondent #1)
Brownfields are caused by sites becoming contaminated and then
their cleanup costs being uneconomic to undertake. Deterrents to
brownfield reuse include (1.) lack of available subsidy to allow
redevelopment of the site at prices which will allow the new use to
effectively compete in the marketplace, and (2.) unpaid property taxes on
abandoned sites which must be paid. Municipalities cannot give up this
revenue, even though taxes may be more than the value of the property.
(Municipal respondent #2)
Dozens of sites are listed by NJDEP where the only problem may have
been a minor leak from an Underground Storage Tank (UST). DEP's lists
make no distinction between a site with minor contamination (or even a site
with possible contamination) and a site contaminated nearly enough to be a
Superfund site. There are serious flaws in DEP's records, as well as in their
communication with local government, the public and developers. It is
difficult to obtain accurate information about sites and their status.
(Municipal respondent #3)
The KCS (Known Contaminated Sites) list is pretty useless as so
many sites are gas stations undergoing tank pulls which may have had
some minor contamination or a spill at one time. We're using NJDEP's
VCP (Voluntary Cleanup Plan) and we need more funding! (Municipal
respondent #4)
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In New Jersey the transfer of property is held hostage to
environmental laws. This is a poor policy for urban redevelopment. The
policy leaves property undeveloped even in the face of rising demand.
Moreover, the impact is that cleanup does not occur. (Municipal
respondent)
Federal tax relief would be most important for brownfield
redevelopment; state tax relief is also very important. Also important is an
effective means for community participation in project development. (NGO
respondent)
A likely result of returning all brownfields to productive use would be
an economic upturn (more jobs, more dollars spent and saved, less welfare,
etc. (State agency respondent.)

4.3 Interview Results
4.3.1 Purpose of Interview
The interview was intended to refine information gathered during the
survey phase. Specifically, some respondents had concerns and comments
about the help their communities were receiving from New Jersey's state
agencies in redeveloping brownfields. The telephone interview helped to
determine respondents' concerns, and to translate those issues into a form
that could be presented to the agencies concerned. It was administered to
those municipal participants who had completed the earlier questionnaire.
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The interview also asked respondents to rate a series of brownfield
redevelopment tools currently available in New Jersey. It also asked
respondents to outline what they most need to conduct brownfield
redevelopment in their communities.
Interview questions are listed below.

"How effective are New Jersey's state agencies at assisting your community
in redeveloping its brownfields?"
■ New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection. Overall, most
respondents to this survey felt that DEP was effective in assisting their
communities. Most (77.77%) rated the agency either Very Effective or
Effective. However, 22.22% of respondents rated the agency Neither
Effective nor Ineffective. The agency had an average of 3.89 out of a
possible 5. Distribution of the responses is found in Table 24 at the end of
this chapter.
• New Jersey Economic Development Authority. Most respondents
were generally favorable in their opinions about the EDA. The agency
was rated either Very Effective or Effective by 55.55% of respondents,
while 22.22% rated it Neither Effective nor Ineffective. EDA had an
average score of 4.14 out of a possible 5. The EDA ratings reflect that not
all respondents had experience with the agency, and 22.22% of
respondents did not provide an opinion about its effectiveness.
Distribution of the responses is found in Table 25 at the end of this
chapter.
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"How satisfied are you with the actions that New Jersey's state agencies
have taken to assist with brownfield redevelopment in your community?"
■ New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection. While most
(55.55%) of respondents said they were either Very Satisfied or Satisfied
with the agency's actions to assist their communities, the remainder
(44.44%) were Neither Satisfied nor Dissatisfied. This could be inferred
as almost half believing that the agency makes no difference, either
positive or negative, on policy actions. The agency had an average of 3.78
of a possible 5. Distribution of the responses is found in Table 26 at the
end of this chapter.
■ New Jersey Economic Development Authority. Most respondents
(66.67%) said they were either Very Satisfied or Satisfied with EDA's
assistance to their communities. A minority (11.11%) said they were
Neither Satisfied nor Dissatisfied with EDA, and 22.22% did not provide
an opinion of the agency. EDA had an average of 4 of a possible 5.
Distribution of the responses is found in Table 27 at the end of this
chapter.

"How effective do you believe the following policy tools to be for brownfield
redevelopment in your community?"
■ Ten—Year Tax Abatement to Offset Remediation Costs on Properties that
are Being Remediated. Most respondents who provided an opinion on
this policy tool responded unfavorably. This factor was rated Very
Effective by 11.11% and Effective by 11.11%. This factor was rated either
Not at all Effective or Not Effective by 33.33% of those surveyed. Almost
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half (44.44%) of those surveyed did not provide an opinion on this issue
(for lack of experience using this factor). Distribution of the responses is
found in Table 28 at the end of this chapter.
■ Industrial Site Recovery Act. Most respondents viewed this factor as
Effective (55.55%). However, 11.11% rated this as Neither Effective nor
Ineffective, and 33.33% rated it as either Not at all Effective or Not
Effective. This factor had an average score of 3.11 out of a possible 5.
Distribution of the responses is found in Table 29 at the end of this
chapter.
■ The Spill Act Fund. A small percentage (11.11%) of those surveyed rated
this factor as Effective, while 22.22% rated it as Neither Effective nor
Ineffective, and 11.11% rated it as Not Effective. Most surveyed (55.55% )
did not provide an opinion on this factor (for lack of experience using
this factor). This factor had an average of 3 of a possible 5. Distribution of
the responses is found in Table 30 at the end of this chapter.
■ Voluntary Cleanup Plan. Responses to this factor were evenly divided
among positive, neutral and no opinion. One third (33.33%) of those
surveyed rated it as either Very Effective or Effective. One third rated it as
Neither Effective nor Ineffective. The remaining third (33.33%) did not
provide an opinion on this factor (for lack of experience using this factor).
Distribution of the responses is found in Table 31 at the end of this
chapter.
■ Funding to assist property owners in conducting remediation. A
minority (22.22%) of those surveyed rated this as either Very Effective or
Effective, while an additional 11.11% rated it as Neither Effective nor
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Ineffective. An additional 22.22% rated it as Not Effective. Nearly half
(44.44%) of those surveyed did not provide an opinion on this item (for
lack of experience using this factor). This factor had an average score of
3.2 of a possible 5. Distribution of the responses is found in Table 32 at the
end of this chapter.
■ Funding to assist municipalities in dealing with discharges of
hazardous materials. One third (33.33%) of those surveyed rated this
item as either Very Effective or Effective, and 11.11% rated it as Not
Effective. However, more than half (55.55%) of those surveyed did not
provide an opinion about this item (for lack of experience using this
factor). This factor had an average score of 4 of a possible 5. Distribution
of the responses is found in Table 33 at the end of this chapter.

"What policies, if any, do you think need to be put into place to better serve
your community in the brownfield redevelopment process?" Most
respondents said that additional funding was their greatest need. Another
respondent said that municipalities need to get better terms from the state
on repaying loans. This respondent said that, especially with reference to
the Hazardous Discharge Site Remediation Fund, the terms are
unfavorable for municipalities, and that a restructuring of the Fund is
needed. This respondent also said that if adequate funding exists at the
Federal and state levels, this would expedite brownfield redevelopment.
Another respondent said that EPA needs to establish finality at the Federal
level. When a remediation action is conducted under DEP supervision,
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there needs to be a mechanism to ensure that once DEP has approved the
remediation, EPA needs to accept that as a final cleanup.

"What single item would most benefit you in redeveloping your
community's brownfields?" One respondent said that a brownfield "czar"
who could direct policy in a centralized fashion would be helpful. This
respondent said that the current system is bureaucratic, and that different
agencies often give conflicting guidance on issues. Another respondent
asked for greater flexibility from the regulating agencies in conducting site
characterization. Another respondent said that a need exists for
exemptions from liability and compliance under ISRA for non—profit
developers. Several respondents said that their communities needed more
grant money for remediation and characterization. One respondent pointed
out that brownfield redevelopment is only the tip of the iceberg in the larger
issue of urban redevelopment.

4.4 Conclusions
4.4.1 Discussion
This section recaps the major findings of the study. It will provide the most
significant causes of brownfields, the most likely remedies for brownfields,
and the most likely positive effects of brownfield redevelopment.
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4.4.2 Factors that Have Contributed to the Continued Existence of
Brownfields
From the Federal/State/NGO perspective, the most likely factors that have
contributed to the continued existence of brownfields in New Jersey were:
■ Existing blight in urban areas.
■ Liability provisions contained in the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act (Superfund Act), or in other
environmental laws.
■ Lack of available funding for the purchase and remediation of
brownfields.
From the municipal perspective, the most the most likely factors that have
contributed to the continued existence of brownfields were:
■ Liability provisions contained in the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act (Superfund Act), or in other
environmental laws.
■ Lack of available funding for the purchase and remediation of
brownfields.
■ Tax policies that deter redevelopment of brownfields.

4.4.3 Remedies for Brownfields
From the Federal/State/NGO perspective, the most important remedies for
brownfields were:
■ Programs that provide relief from liability under environmental laws
(CERCLA, ISRA, etc.)
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■ Availability of additional funding from any source (Loan guarantees,
grants, public—private consortiums, etc.)
■ Targeted tax breaks from any level of government (e.g., designation of a
community as an Empowerment Zone or Enterprise Community).
From the municipal perspective, the most important remedies for
brownfields were:
■ Availability of additional funding from any source (Loan guarantees,
grants, public—private consortiums, etc.)
■ Programs that provide relief from liability under environmental laws
(CERCLA, ISRA, etc.)
■ Targeted tax breaks from any level of government (e.g., designation of a
community as an Empowerment Zone or Enterprise Community).

4.4.4 Positive Effects
From the Federal/State/NGO perspective, the most likely positive effects of
brownfield redevelopment were:
■ Improving blighted areas. All respondents felt that this would happen
with brownfield redevelopment.
■ Job Creation. Again, all respondents felt that this would happen with
brownfield redevelopment.
■ Higher property values. Again, all respondents felt that this would
happen with brownfield redevelopment.
From the municipal perspective, the most likely positive effects of
brownfield redevelopment were:
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■ Improving blighted areas. Eighty percent of respondents felt that this
would happen with brownfield redevelopment.
■ Enhanced property tax revenues. Eighty percent of respondents said this
factor would happen with brownfield redevelopment.
■ Job creation. Again, 80% of the respondents said this would happen with
brownfield redevelopment.
The next section of this chapter contains the summary tables and
distribution tables of the responses to the questions listed above.

80
Table 3: Distribution of Responses to Brownfield Significance (Municipal

Respondents).

Brownfield Significance
to Local Community

Very Significant /
Significant
Neither Significant nor
Insignificant
Insignificant / Very
Insignificant
Don't Know/Other

60%
20%
10%
10%

•
Lame %; r euerkwoutueriNt.xv n/espoliseb toT Tnypotnesis
in.ree.
Th
ree.

Patr r
Existing blight in urban areas.
Lack of available funding for
the purchase and remediation
of brownfields.
Liability provisions contained
in the Comprehensive
Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability
Act (Superfund Act), or in other
environmental laws.
Crime and public safety.
Tax policies that deter
redevelopment of brownfields.

2

1

1
1

2
2

2
2.6

3

2

2

2.8

4
5

3
5

3
4

3.6
4

81
Table 5: Municipal Responses to Hypothesis Three.
Fac
Mode
di
1
1
Liability provisions
1

1.5

V

contained in the
Comprehensive
Environmental
Response,
Compensation and
Liability Act
(Superfund Act), or in
other environmental
laws.
Lack of available
funding for the
purchase and
remediation of
brownfields.
Tax policies that deter
redevelopment of
brownfields.
Existing blight in
urban areas.
Crime and public
safety.

2

1

1.5

1.5

3

3

3

3.5

4

3

4

3.71

5

5

5

4.57

Table 6: FederallState/NGO Responses to Hypothesis Four.
.

Programs that provide relief
from liability under
environmental laws
(CERCLA, ISRA, etc.)
Availability of additional
funding from any source
(Loan guarantees, grants,
public—private consortiums,
etc.)
Targeted tax breaks from any
level of government
(e.g., designation of a
community as an
Empowerment Zone or
Enterprise Community)
Adjustments to local property
tax rates
Tax exemptions on specific
properties
Adjustments to state tax rates
Zoning Variances

.

1

1

2

2.8

2

4

2

2.33

3

2

2

2.8

4

3

3

3.25

5

—

4

4.25

6
7

6
7

5.5
6.5

5.25
6.25

Distribution of Results for Improving Blighted Areas
(Federal/State/NGO Respondents).

Table 8:

Improving Blighted
Areas

Very Likely I Likely

100%

Neither Likely nor
Unlikely
Unlikely / Very
Unlikely
Don't Know/Other

0%
0%
0%
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Table 9: Distribution of Responses for Job Creation (Federal/State/NGO

Respondents).
Job Creation

Very Likely / Likely
Neither Likely nor
Unlikely
Unlikely / Very
Unlikely
Don't Know/Other

100%

0
0
0

Table 10: Distribution of Responses for Higher Property Values

(Federal/State/NGO Respondents).
Higher Property Values

Very Likely / Likely
Neither Likely nor
Unlikely
Unlikely / Very
Unlikely
Don't Know/Other

100%
0
0
0

Table 11: Distribution of Responses for Enhanced Property Tax Revenues

(Federal/State/NGO Respondents).
Enhanced Property Tax
Revenues

Very Likely / Likely

87.5%

Neither Likely nor
Unlikely
Unlikely / Very
Unlikely
Don't Know/Other

12.5%
0
0
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Table 12: Distribution of Results for Improved Crime and Safety Issues

(Federal/State/NGO Respondents).
Improved Crime and
Safety Issues

Very Likely / Likely

87.5%

Neither Likely nor
Unlikely
Unlikely / Very
Unlikely
Don't Know/Other

12.5%

0
0

Table 13: Distribution of Responses for Improving Blighted Areas

(Municipal Respondents).
Improving Blighted
Areas

Very Likely / Likely

80%

Neither Likely nor
Unlikely
Unlikely / Very
Unlikely
Don't Know/Other

10%

0
10%

Table 14: Distribution of Responses for Enhanced Property Tax Revenues

(Municipal Respondents).

Enhanced Property Tax
Revenues

Very Likely / Likely

80%

Neither Likely nor
Unlikely
Unlikely / Very
Unlikely
Don't Know/Other

10%
0
10%
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Table 15: Distribution of Responses for Job Creation (Municipal

Respondents).

Job Creation

Very Likely / Likely
Neither Likely nor
Unlikely
Unlikely / Very
Unlikely
Don't Know/Other

80%
10%

0
10%

Table 16: Distribution of Responses for Higher Property Values (Municipal

Respondents).

Higher Property Values

Very Likely / Likely
Neither Likely nor
Unlikely
Unlikely / Very
Unlikely
Don't Know/Other

80%
10%

0
10%

Table 17: Distribution of Responses for Improved Crime and Safety Issues

(Municipal Respondents).
Improved Crime and
Safety Issues

Very Likely / Likely

60%

Neither Likely nor
Unlikely
Unlikely / Very
Unlikely
Don't Know/Other

30%

0
10%
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Table 18: Distribution of Responses for Availability of Funding

(Federal/State/NGO Respondents).
Availability of Funding

Very Effective /
Effective
Neither Effective nor
Ineffective
Ineffective / Very
Ineffective
Don't Know/Other

75%
0
0
25%

Table 19: Distribution of Responses for Liability Relief (Federal/State/NGO

Respondents).

Liability relief from
State or Federal
Government

Very Effective /

75%

Neither Effective nor
Ineffective
Ineffective / Very
Ineffective
Don't Know/Other

0

Effective

12.5%
12.5%

Table 20: Distribution of Responses for Tax Relief (Federal/State/NGO

Respondents).

Tax Relief from the State
or Federal Government

Very Effective /
Effective
Neither Effective nor
Ineffective
Ineffective / Very
Ineffective
Don't Know/Other

75%
12.5%
0
12.5%
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Table 21: Distribution of Responses for Funding Availability (Municipal
Respondents).
Availability of Funding

Very Effective /
Effective
Neither Effective nor

90%

Ineffective / Very

0

Don't Know/Other

10%

Ineffective
Ineffective

0

Table 22: Distribution of Responses for Liability Relief (Municipal
Respondents).
Liability Relief from the
State or Federal
Government

Very Effective /
Effective

70%

Neither Effective nor

20%

Ineffective / Very

0

Don't Know/Other

10%

Ineffective
Ineffective

Table 23: Distribution of Responses for Tax Relief (Municipal
Respondents).
Tax Relief from the State
or Federal Government

Very Effective /
Effective
Neither Effective nor
Ineffective
Ineffective / Very
Ineffective
Don't Know/Other

60%
30%
0
10%
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Table 24: Distribution of Responses to DEP Effectiveness.
How Effective is the New
Jersey DEP in assisting
your community on
brownfield issues?

Very Effective /
Effective

77.77%

Neither Effective nor
Ineffective
Ineffective / Very
Ineffective
Don't Know/Other

22.22%
0
0

Table 25: Distribution of Responses to EDA Effectiveness.
How Effective is the New
Jersey EDA in assisting
your community on
brownfield issues?

Very Effective /
Effective

55.55%

Neither Effective nor
Ineffective
Ineffective / Very
Ineffective
Don't Know/Other

22.22%
0
22.22%

Table 26: Distribution of Responses to DEP Satisfaction.
How Satisfied are you
with the actions taken by
the New Jersey DEP in
assisting your
community on
brownfield issues?

Very Satisfied /
Satisfied

55.55%

Neither Satisfied nor
Dissatisfied
Dissatisfied / Very
Dissatisfied
Don't Know/Other

44.44%
0

10%
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Table 27: Distribution of Responses to EDA Satisfaction.
How Satisfied are you
with the actions taken by
the New Jersey DEP in
assisting your
community on
brownfield issues?

Very Satisfied /
Satisfied

66.67%

Neither Satisfied nor
Dissatisfied

Dissatisfied / Very

0

Don't Know/Other

22.22%

Dissatisfied

Table 28: Distribution of Responses to the Effectiveness of Ten—Year Tax
Abatement to Offset Remediation Costs.
How Effective is the
10-year tax abatement to
offset remediation costs?

Very Effective /
Effective

22.22%

Neither Effective nor
Ineffective
Not Effective / Not at all
Effective
Don't Know/Other

0%
33.33%
44.44%

Table 29: Distribution of Responses to the Effectiveness of the Industrial
Site Recovery Act.
How Effective is the
Industrial Site Recovery
Act for Brownfield
redevelopment?

Very Effective /
Effective
Neither Effective nor
Ineffective
Ineffective / Very
Ineffective
Don't Know/Other

55.55%

33.33%
0

90
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Table 33: Distribution of Responses to the Effectiveness of Funding to

Assist Municipalities in Dealing with Discharges of Hazardous Materials.

Caveats to the Reader

It is important for the reader to understand some of the weaknesses
inherent in the data presented above. The sample size is small (eight in the
Federal/State/NGO group, ten in the municipal group, and nine in the
telephone survey). Additionally, these were single-point surveys. If the
sample size had been larger, or if there had been more surveys conducted
within municipalities, the results might have been different. Additionally,
not all respondents answered all questions. This could have skewed the
data as well.
In the final chapter, there will be a discussion of policy
recommendations to various governmental entities which, if implemented,
will help with the redevelopment of brownfields throughout the state, and to
some extent, the nation.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In the previous chapter, the reader saw the specific elements of data
analysis. The reader should now have a better understanding about what
policies are important for brownfield redevelopment in municipalities. In
this chapter, some larger issues will be discussed, and recommendations
for policy changes will follow. The chapter will conclude with some
recommendations for further study.

5.1 Finality of Remediation Actions
At the Federal level, CERCLA imposes a series of liability provisions, which

can be imposed retroactively on any party that has ever participated in the
ownership, management or operation of a site. However, the law does not
address when a remediation action has been completed. If a remediating
party completes a remediation action under EPA supervision, the party is
never truly released from liability. If remediation standards change, EPA
can direct additional cleanup action on a site. Until this changes,
responsible parties will probably be reluctant to assume liability for
remediation on a site. Many states (including New Jersey) have programs
that establish some form of finality. New Jersey, for instance, will issue a
No Further Action Letter to a responsible party at the end of a
DEP—approved remediation. This generally frees the responsible party from
concern about future action as long as no new contamination occurs.
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However, both DEP and EPA could still order that further action be taken at
the same site. This leads to confusion as to whose guidance to follow
(Federal or State), and slows the pace of remediation.
Recommendations:
In states whose remediation standards are at least equal to Federal
requirements, USEPA accept the finality of a state–supervised remediation
action.
USEPA establish clear remediation standards that specify "how clean is
clean." Issue these in conjunction with the establishment of finality on
liability for past contamination in all Federally supervised remediation
actions.
Implementation of these recommendations will require some
Congressional action. However, these items are important enough that
USEPA should consider them as part of its legislative agenda.

5.2 Recommendations for Future Study
Brownfields pose an ideal area for study in several areas. As was outlined
in the Introductory chapter, brownfield issues can be divided into three
areas—environmental, economic and socio–political. While many
researchers have conducted studies on brow nfields, and many people have
-

written articles and papers on the subject, it appears that there would be
utility in a study project similar to this one, but at a regional or national
level. A doctoral–level dissertation on brownfield incentives in the "Rust
Belt" (concentrating on the Northeast and Midwest) could examine issues
raised here in much greater depth.
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While another student has recently explored the real estate
developer's concerns with brownfields, there is also room to study the
lending community's response to recent legislative changes. For instance,
Governor Whitman signed the "Brownfield and Contaminated Site
Remediation act. This new law changes several provisions in the state
liability scheme. In 1996, the Congress passed a Federal lender liability law.
A study of the lending community could gain their reactions to these laws.
Do the new laws ease lenders' concerns about liability? Do they encourage
lending on environmentally challenged properties? Do these laws actually
do what the legislature intended, or are they "feel good" laws that are not
enforceable? These and other questions can only be answered through
further study.
Recommendation: The Center for Policy Studies and the Center for
Environmental Engineering and Science at NJIT sponsor a Ph.D. student
in the Environmental Policy program that has recently been established.
This student should conduct research into regional brownfield policy issues
(specifically in EPA Regions I and II), and should conduct an in—depth
analysis of all areas relating to the problems. The study should include the
role of the lending community, as well as following up this work and other
work done on the role of the developer. Ideally, this student should be
recruited to begin study in the Fall of 1998, and should be under dual
supervision of both centers.
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5.3 Concluding Comments
While this thesis represents the capstone of the author's academic
endeavors thus far, it is hoped that the endeavor has educated the reader
about one of the environmental issues that can be solved. It answers the
questions the author set out to answer: what are the causes of New Jersey's
brownfields, what are the remedies that would most impact on solving the
problem, and what policies are needed but not present. Completing this
project has been a challenge, but it has been worth the effort. It is hoped the
information contained herein will make a difference to those who deal with
this problem on a daily basis.

APPENDIX A
QUESTIONNAIRE SENT TO FEDERAL/STATE/NGO STUDY
PARTICIPANTS
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New Jersey has, by some estimates, thousands of brown.field sites. This
questionnaire is designed to gather information about what could help get
brownfields remediated faster. The questions below apply to brownfields
throughout the state. Please select the answer that best describes your
opinion of the brownfield redevelopment process by circling the appropriate
number.
1.How significant a problem are brownfields in New Jersey?

1

2

3

4

2. Brownfields are thought to have a number of effects. Below are a series of
factors that may or may not impact on New Jersey. Please rate the following
based on how likely you think they are to impact New Jersey.

5
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a.Please list any other factors you think Brownfields play a part in New
Jersey.

b. If you listed more than one factor, please state which is the most important
in your opinion.

3. Many factors have been thought of as causes for Brownfields. Below are a
list of factors that are commonly thought as causes of Brownfields. Please
rank them in terms of how responsible you think they are in terms of causing
New Jersey's Brownfields. Assign only one number per statement.
For example, if you believe that Tax Policy is the most important cause of
Brownfields, place a "1" in the shaded box next to that item. If you believe that Urban
Blight is the second most important cause of brownfields, place a "2" in the shaded
box next to that item. Continue until all items have been ranked.

Liability provisions contained in the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
(Superfund Act), or in other environmental laws.
Tax policies that deter redevelopment of brownfields.
Lack of available funding for the purchase and remediation of
brownfields.
Existing blight in urban areas.
Crime and public safety.
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a. Please list any other factors you think caused brownfields in New Jersey.

b. If you listed more than one factor, please state which is the most important
in your opinion.
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4. Many factors have been thought of as potential remedies (corrective
actions) for brownfields. Below are a list of remedies that may or may not
help to solve New Jersey's brownfields problems. Please rank them in terms
of how important you think they are in terms of correcting New Jersey's
brownfields. Assign only one number per statement.
For example, if you believe that Tax Policy is the most important remedy of
brownfields, place a "1" in the shaded box next to that item. If you believe that Urban
Blight is the second most important remedy of brownfields, place a "2" in the shaded
box next to that item. Continue until all items have been ranked.

Think
Adjustments to state property tax rates
Adjustments to local property tax rates
Targeted tax breaks from any level of government
(e.g., designation of a community as an
Empowerment Zone or Enterprise Community)
Tax exemptions on specific properties
Programs that provide relief from liability under
environmental laws (CERCLA, LSRA, etc.)
Availability of additional funding from any source
(Loan guarantees, grants, public—private consortiums,
etc.)
Zoning Variances

a. Please list any other factors you think could remedy brownfields in New
Jersey.
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b. If you listed more than one factor, please state which is the most important
in your opinion.

5. If all brownfields were returned to productive use, many positive effects
could be realized. Below are a list of outcomes that might occur in New Jersey
if all brownfields were completely redeveloped. Please rate how likely you
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b. If you listed more than one factor, please state which is the most important
in your opinion.

6. Many different approaches have been proposed for redeveloping
brownfields. Below is a list of potential actions to assist in redeveloping
brownfields. Please rate how effective you believe each of the following is by
circling the annwinriath number below_
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b. If you listed more than one factor, please state which is the most important
in your opinion.

Please use the space below to address any other issues not covered in this
questionnaire.

So that I may contact you later, please provide the following.
Department of
Prepared by:
Phone:
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND COOPERATION IN THIS SURVEY.

APPENDIX B
QUESTIONNAIRE SENT TO MUNICIPAL STUDY PARTICIPANTS
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New Jersey has, by some estimates, thousands of brownfield sites. This
questionnaire is intended to gather information about what could help get
brownfields remediated faster. The questions below apply to brownfields in
your community. Please select the answer that best describes your opinion of
the brownfield redevelopment process by circling the appropriate number.
1. How significant a problem are brownfields in your community?

a. Please list any other factors you think brownfields play a part in your
community.
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b. If you listed more than one factor, please state which is the most important
in your opinion.

3. Many factors have been thought of as causes for brownfields. Below are a
list of factors that are commonly thought responsible for brownfields. Please
rank them in terms of how responsible you think they are in terms of your
community's brownfields. Assign only one number per statement.
For example, if you believe that Tax Policy is the most important cause
of brownfields, place a "1" in the shaded box next to that item. If you believe
that Urban Blight is the second most important cause of brownfields, place a
"2" in the shaded box next to that item. Continue until all items have been
ranked.
.

.

•

•,'•••
•

• -•

•••:.
•

•

.:.::•.:
•
••
• ••

•.

•

••

•

•

•••

•

•••

Liability provisions contained in the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
(Superfund Act), or in other environmental laws.
Tax policies that deter redevelopment of brownfields.
Lack of available funding for the purchase and remediation of
brownfields.
Existing blight in urban areas.
Crime and public safety.

a. Please list any other factors you think caused brownfields in your
community.
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b. If you listed more than one factor, please state which is the most important
in your opinion.

4. Many factors have been thought of as potential remedies (corrective
actions) for brownfields. Below are a list of remedies that may or may not
help to solve brownfields problems. Please rank them in terms of how
important you think they are in terms of correcting your community's
brownfields. Assign only one number per statement.
For example, if you believe that Tax Policy is the most important
remedy for brownfields, place a "1" in the shaded box next to that item. If you
believe that Urban Blight is the second most important remedy for
brownfields, place a "2" in the shaded box next to that item. Continue until all
items have been ranked.
.

.

.

Adjustments to state property tax rates
Adjustments to local property tax rates
Targeted tax breaks from any level of government
(e.g., designation of a community as an
Empowerment Zone or Enterprise Community)
Tax exemptions on specific properties
Programs that provide relief from liability under
environmental laws (CERCLA, ISRA, etc.)
Availability of additional funding from any source
(Loan guarantees, grants, public—private consortiums,
etc.)
Zoning Variances

Ratik
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a. Please list any other factors you think could help to remedy brownfields in
your community.

b. If you listed more than one factor, please state which is the most important
in your opinion.
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5. If all brownfields were returned to productive use, many positive effects
could be realized. Below are a list of outcomes that might occur in your
community if all brownfields were completely redeveloped. Please rate how
likely you believe each outcome to be by circling the appropriate number
below.

all brownfields were returned to productive use immediately.
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b. If you listed more than one factor, please state which is the most important
in your opinion.

6. Many different approaches have been proposed for redeveloping
brownfields. Below is a list of potential actions or policies to assist in
redeveloping brownfields. Please rate how effective you believe each of the
following is by circling the appropriate number below.
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b. If you listed more than one factor, please state which is the most important
in your opinion.

Please use the space below to address any other issues not covered in this
questionnaire.

So that I may contact you later, please provide the following.
City of
Prepared by:
Phone:
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND COOPERATION IN THIS
SURVEY.

APPENDIX C
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Agency
Question

Description
Brownfield
1 Significance

Lower
Property
2.1 Values

2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5

Lower
Property Tax
Revenue
Job Loss
Urban Blight
Crime/Safety

3 Causes of BF
3.1 Liability
3.2 Tax policy
Lack of
3.3 Funding
3.4 Urban Blight
3.5 Crime/Safety
Remedies for
4 BF
State property
4.1 tax

USEPA

NEMW

NJDEP

NJDOC

NJEDA

Ironbound

Mode

Median

Average

4

5

5

4

4

4

5

5

4.5

4.5

4

4

3

5

4

4

4

4

4

4

4

4
5

5
3
5

5
4
5
4

5
5
5
5

4
2
5
5

4
4
4
3

5
5
5

3

5
1
5
4

5
4
5
5

5
4
5
4.5

4.67
3.5
4.8
4.3

1
3

1
3

4
2

2
5

1
5

5
4

2
4

2
5

2
4

2.8
4

2
4

2
4
5

5
1

2
3
4

1
2
3

1
3
5

1
1
3

2
2
3

2.6
2

3

4
1
3

3.6

6

6

5

4

6

6

5.5

5.25

5

1

6

3

3

3

3

3.25

2

4

2

2

2.8

5
7

7
2

1

4
2

4.25
2.8

1
6

1
5

4
7

2
6.5

2.33
6.25

5

Targeted tax
4.3 breaks

1

2

5

2

Specific tax
4.4 exemptions
4.5 Liability relief

3
2

3
1

2
3

3
1

4

4
7

4
7

4
7

Positive
5 Effects

NCC

4
4

Local
4.2 property tax

Additional
4.6 Funding
4.7 Zoning

ISLES

1
2

5

1
#NUM!

2

Higher
Property
5.1 Values
Greater
Property Tax
5.2 Revenues
5.3 Job Creation
Reduced
5.4 Blight
Enhanced
5.5 Safety
Potential
6 Actions
6.1 Tax Relief
6.2 Liability Relief
Funding
6.3 availability

5

5

5

4

4

4

4

5

4

4

4.33

5
5

5
4

5
5

4
5

4
4

3
4

4
5

5
4

4
5

4
4.5

4.17
4.5

5

4

5

5

4

5

5

4

5

5

4.67

5

3

4

4

4

5

4

4

4

4

4.17

4

5

5

4

3

4

4

4

4

4.17

5

5

5

5

2

4

4

5

4.5

4.17

5

5

5

4

4

4

5

4.5

4.5
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Municipalit Atlantic
City

Elizabeth

Jersey City

New
Brunswick

Newark

Y

Question

Newton

Phillipsbur Trenton

Paterson

Anonymou Mode
s
Submissio
n

g

Median

Average

Description
1 Brownfield

3

5

5

4

2

3

4

4

4

5

5

3

2

4

4

4

4

5

5

3

2

4

2
4
3

4
4
4

4
5
5

5
5
5

2
2
2

2
2
2

2
4
1

1
3
2

1
3
1

1
3
2

3
5

4
5

5
4

5

4

3.89

5

4

4

4

5

5

5

4

4.11

4
4
3

4
4
2

4
5
4

4
4
2

4,
4
3

3.44
3.89
3.33

1
3
2

3
2
1

1
5
2

2
5
1

1
3
1

1
3
1.5

1.50
3.50
1.50

4
5

4
5

3
4

3
4

51

4
5

3.71
4.57

5

3

4

4j

4

4

7

5

51

4.5

4.67

5

4

Significance
2.1 Lower
Property
Values
2.2 Lower
Property Tax
Revenue
2.3 Job Loss
2.4 Urban Blight
2.5 Crime/Safety
3 Causes of
BF
3.1 Liability
3.2 Tax policy
3.3 Lack of
Funding
3.4 Urban Blight
3.5 Crime/Safety

4 Remedies
for BF
4.1 State
property tax
4.2 Local
property tax
4.3 Targeted tax
breaks
4.4 Specific tax
exemptions
4.5 Liability relief
4.6 Additional
Funding
4.7 Zoning
5 Positive
Effects
5.1 Higher
Property
Values

4
3

5

4

2

2

3

5

6

1

1

6

7

4

5

4

3,

3

3

2

7

21

3

3.5

3

4

7

6

3

31

3

a

2

1

2

1

4

2

2

2

2.875

1

2

1

2

1

1

1

1

1.25

6

5

6

6

6

6

3

4

5

4

4

4.22

4

5

4

4

1

5.2 Greater
Property Tax
Revenues

5

5

5

5

4

3

4

5

4

5

5

4.44

5.3 Job Creation

5

5

4

5

4

3

4

5

4

5

4

4.33

5.4 Reduced
Blight
5.5 Enhanced
Safety

5

5

5

5

4

3

4

5

5

5

5

4.56

3

5

5

5

4

3

4

3

4

3

4

4

4
4

4
3

4
5

3
5

4
4

4
5

3
3

3
4

5
5

4
5

4
4

3.78
4.22

5

5

5

5

5

5

5

5

5

5

5

5

6 Potential
Actions
6.1 Tax Relief
6.2 Liability
Relief
6.3 Funding
availability
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C o ntact:
oanicipality:
/ r ecently sent you a set of questions dealing with Brownfield redevelopment.

ria now like to take a few minutes to develop some more information, based in
10-ge part on the responses I received from you and other respondents.
Part I—State Agencies and Assistance to Communities
1.
Iiow effective are New Jersey's state agencies at assisting your community in

r edeveloping its brownfields?
New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection:

U
[=1
L3

Not at all Effective
Somewhat Ineffective
Neither Effective nor Ineffective
Effective
Very Effective
Don't Know/Other

New Jersey Economic Development Authority
❑
❑
❑
❑
Zi
[

Not at all Effective
Somewhat Ineffective
Neither Effective nor Ineffective
Effective
Very Effective
Don't Know/Other
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2.
a. How satisfied are you with the actions that New Jersey state agencies have
taken to assist with brownfield redevelopment in your community?
New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection:
❑
❑
[::1
❑
❑

Not at all Satisfied
Somewhat Dissatisfied
Neither Satisfied nor Dissatisfied
Satisfied
Very Satisfied

❑

Don't Know/Other

New Jersey Economic Development Authority:
❑
❑
❑
❑
❑
❑

Not at all Satisfied
Somewhat Dissatisfied
Neither Satisfied nor Dissatisfied
Satisfied
Very Satisfied
Don't Know/Other

3. What, in your opinion, could New Jersey state agencies do better (do they
do well) in promoting brownfield redevelopment?
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Part II—Policy Effectiveness
4. Please rate the following tools on their effectiveness in brownfield
redevelopment in your community.
a. Ten-Year Tax Abatement to Offset Remediation Costs on Properties
that are Being Remediated
❑
Not at all Effective
❑
Not Effective
[:1
Neither Effective nor Ineffective
❑
Effective
Very Effective
❑
Other/Don't Know
❑
b. Industrial Site Recovery Act
[:1
Not at all Effective
❑
Not Effective
Neither Effective nor Ineffective
❑
❑
Effective
Very Effective
❑
LI
0 the r/Don' t Know
c. The Spill Act Fund
❑
Not at all Effective
❑
Not Effective
Neither Effective nor Ineffective
❑
❑
Effective
Very Effective
❑
O the r/Don't Know
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d. Voluntary Cleanup Plan

❑
❑
❑
❑
❑

Not at all Effective
Not Effective
Neither Effective nor Ineffective
Effective
Very Effective
Other/Don't Know

e. Funding to assist property owners in conducting remediation

❑
❑
❑
❑
❑

Not at all Effective
Not Effective
Neither Effective nor Ineffective
Effective
Very Effective
Other/Don't Know

f. Funding to assist municipalities in dealing with discharges of
hazardous materials

❑
❑
❑
❑
❑
❑

Not at all Effective
Not Effective
Neither Effective nor Ineffective
Effective
Very Effective
Other/Don't Know

5. What policies, if any, do you think need to be put into place to better serve
your community in the brownfield redevelopment process?
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6. If you could select a single item that would most benefit you in doing your
community's brownfields work, what would that item be, and why?

7. Can you suggest other people in your community I should speak with on
brownfield issues?

APPENDIXF

RESULTS OF FOLLOW-UP INTERVIEW WITH
MUNICIPAL OFFICIALS
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Municipality

3a
3b
3c
3d

Description
DEP Effective
EDA Effective
DEP Satisfy
EDA Satisfy
Prop Tax
Abate
ISRA
Spill Act Fund
VCP

3e

Funds for Prop
Owners

3f

Funds for
muni's

Question
la
1b
2a
2b

Phillipsbur
Newton
g
4
5
4
4

4
4

1
3

4

4

5

4

Newark

Atlantic
City

Elizabeth

New
Brunswick

Jersey
City

4
4
5
4

4
5
4
5

5
3
5
4

3
3
3
4

4
4
3
3

5
2

4
4

4

1
4

1

4

3

4

3

2

3

4

3

3

3

5

5

5

Trenton

Paterson

Mode

Median

Average

3

4
5
3
4

4
5
4

4
4
4
4

3.89
4.14
3.78
4

2
2

1
4
3
3

2
4
3
3.5

2.6
3.11
3
3.67

2

2

2

3

3.2

4

2

5

4.5

4

3

3
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